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risk of trypanocide resistance. The emphasis is on improving informational and technical supports to
farmers, service providers, veterinary professionals and policy-makers that will promote integrated
control and rational trypanocide use to reduce the long-term risk of resistance, without
compromising the ability of livestock keepers to protect their livestock from the debilitating effects of
trypanosomosis.
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vBox 1: Key lessons learned
Participative (low-level) trypanosomosis control in Burkina Faso was highly effective, and had
many positive impacts but was not long-lasting (sustainable). Community-based (high-level
participative) control has not been tried in Burkina Faso but has a poor record of sustainability
elsewhere. Sustainability is not always necessary, but understanding sustainability objectives is.
Most projects were small scale and because control was limited in time and space, the overall
benefit to livestock owners has not been substantial. Better-bet strategies with potential for mass
impact could include the following:
• Continuing product development of the current vector control strategies to the point where
farmers will spontaneously adapt them and continue to use them
• Promoting the wider adoption of higher-quality community trypanosomosis control by more
development actors (by providing information and lowering entry costs)
• Incentivising the private animal health sector to promote the rational use of trypanocides and
develop new vector control packages
• Improving the policies, rules and norms that govern animal health provision and
consumption at local, national and global levels.
Best practice principles for effective, sustainable control successfully used in projects in Burkina
Faso include:
• Integrated strategies (e.g. the powerful and attractive combination of animal baits and
screens/traps)
• Interventions driven by demand rather than by supply
• Broad stakeholder inclusion, but narrow stakeholder control
• Community training on both technical and management aspects
• Farmer-to-farmer learning and teaching
• Location of skills and competencies for control within the community
• Availability of high levels of technical support from expert agencies
• Contributions by communities
• Long-term, repeated interactions between support agents and community
• Interventions backed by credible epidemiological, entomological and socio-economic
analyses.
Fail-points that contributed to the lack of sustainability in projects in Burkina Faso:
• Communities could not carry out vector control themselves
• Communities could not manage control themselves
• Communities could not pay for control themselves.
There is a wide range of effective and sustainable trypanosomosis control strategies existing in
communities (endogenous trypanosomosis control strategies). Enhancing these strategies has
potentially more impact than externally supported trypanosomosis control, and may be more
cost-effective. But some endogenous strategies are mal-adaptive or have negative externalities,
and most are less effective in the presence of Multiple Drug Resistance.
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Box 1: Key lessons learned (continued)
Threats to effective and sustainable control which require pro-active management include:
 Pseudo participation and ritual participation
 Co-dependency and voluntary disempowerment
 Token cost-sharing, entrenched subsidises and under-writing of delivery costs
 Perverse systems that provide incentives for abuse or tie control to dysfunctional institutions.
The following negative impacts of control are common and should be addressed:
 Cattle cause conflict, implying conflict resolution mechanisms are needed
 Trypanosomosis control can promote irrational drug use; again mitigating measures
are called for.
Lack of information leads to widespread misconceptions, but six simple messages will counter the
most damaging myths:
 Animal sleeping sickness is caused only by a germ spread by tsetse flies
 When tsetse are gone trypanocide use can be greatly reduced
 Tsetse return,  but though control is a long-term commitment, effort and cost
can be significantly downscaled
 Vector control with sprays/pour-ons works by killing flies, and not by protecting cattle
 Failure of animals to get better after treatment can be due to trypanocide resistance
 When Multiple Drug Resistance is severe and widespread, the only options are vector
control or changing the farming system.
Tsetse is not a stand-alone issue for farmers, and usually not their most important livestock
concern. Farmers prefer (but rarely get) integrated approaches to livestock development. If other
disease problems are not addressed, mortality and morbidity can remain high even after successful
tsetse control. Involving Fulani transhumants (who have most livestock, most interest in livestock
and most expertise in livestock disease) is advisable, but challenging.
The trypanosomosis crises of the past were often due to disrupted host-vector balance. These crises
were self-limiting and resolvable by individual action. Conversely the looming trypanosomosis
crisis of Total Drug Resistance is self-perpetuating and intractable to individual management.
1. Community trypanosomosis control in Burkina Faso: Never tried and not
to be recommended?
Introduction
Trypanosomosis is a major threat to animal and human health in sub-Saharan Africa with tsetse
flies infesting an area more than twice the size of the
European Union, threatening the livelihoods of 250
million people1 and costing farmers and consumers
billions of dollars per yeara. Unsurprisingly,
trypanosomosis control (or, more optimistically,
eradication) has been a longstanding development
preoccupation. Historically, control efforts were
dominated by centralised and statist campaigns, but
recent years have seen growth in diversified approaches.
Several factors have contributed to this, namely; the
vacuum left by the rolling-back of government from service provision2; the emergence of
participation as the dominant development paradigm; the development of low-cost, effective,
intermediate technologies for trypanosomosis control; the declining willingness of donors to fund
large-scale, long-term, chemical-intensive programs; and the re-conceptualisation of animal health
as a largely private good. This broader vision of trypanosomosis control has given space for much
important work with community approaches3. However, while there are very many examples of
successful community control in the presence of external support, there are few or no examples of
long-term community control in the absence of external support4.
Experience in Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso is no exception to this axiom. In the last few decades, Burkina Faso led the way in
innovative tsetse control projects incorporating community participation. Projects used low-cost
and effective strategies which resulted in the rapid and total resolution of trypanosomosis problems
in all project areas. Participation and long-term viability issues were incorporated from the onset,
and benefits to farmers were major, obvious and acknowledged.
Yet, despite these substantial successes, none of the
communities have continued with the strategies; tsetse
re-invasion has occurred in all cases, and after years of
investment in participative trypanosomosis control,
farmers are once more ‘on their own’ and experiencing
substantial losses from trypanosomosis.
Multiple Drug Resistance – a new imperative
The sustainabilityb of vector control is particularly urgent given the rapid emergence of resistance
to trypanocides5. Multiple Drug Resistance (MDR) jeopardises the use of trypanocides which have
been for decades the most widely used, sustainable and practical control strategy. Novel drugs,
vaccines and high-producing, genetically-resistant animals may offer exciting options for future
control, but in the here-and-now of villages in the cotton zone, vector control is the most feasible
alternative to trypanocides. (The other major strategy, the use of trypanotolerant animals, can only
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Community participation varies from
compulsory contributions to consultation
to collaboration to control. In
development discourse, collaboration or
control is usually intended. Community-
based implies the community is central
to the process (corresponding to control
or at least collaboration).
To give someone a taste for sugar and
then take that sugar away is not good.
Focus Group Discussion (FGD)
a FAO/WHO/OIE (1965) estimated losses at USD 5 billion, Jahnke et al. (1988) at USD 1.9 billion, Kristjanson et al. (1999) at USD 1.3
billion.
b In this report we use ‘sustainability’ as equivalent to ‘long-term viability’. By this definition, sustainable vector control continues after the
project initiating it has left; incidentally, this was an explicit objective of the participatory projects reviewed here. Ideally, control
interventions would not only be continued, but also adopted by other communities with minimum need for projects or development
interventions as was the case for the use of trypanocides and other innovations such as the use of draught cattle and improved breeds).
However, as continuing with activities already in place is easier than adopting new activities, we used the weaker criterion of
‘continuing’ rather than the stronger criterion of ‘self-starting’ for judging viability.
be a partial substitute for trypanocides as trypanotolerant
cattle under high challenge or stress (e.g. malnutrition,
labour) require and continue to receive trypanocides6.) In
West African villages, tsetse control cannot be provided
effectively by individuals, and is increasingly unlikely to
be provided by governments. However, communities as
organisations, have demonstrated their ability to effectively
(if not sustainably) deliver vector-control, and communities
as collections of individuals, continue to sustainably (if not
always effectively) manage trypanosomosis with minimal
or no external support. Thus the community, whether regarded as an organisation or a collection
of individuals, remains a best-bet for control. In this context, understanding the policy and
institutional enablers and disablers that condition if and how communities effectively and
sustainably manage trypanosomosis is critical.
Objectives of the review
This review re-visits participatory trypanosomosis projects in Burkina Faso to learn key lessons that
can inform and guide future control efforts in the presence of resistance to trypanocides. It
summarises eight projects and analyses their successes and failures and the explanatory narratives
constructed by researchers and communities to account for these. Major threats to the
sustainability of control are flagged, and ways of managing these discussed. The problems of poor
information and poor integration are emphasised. Suggestions are made as to how these lessons
can be applied both to improve control by projects and control in the absence of projects.
Sustainability objectives are proposed and illustrated, and it is argued that though sustainability is
rarely achieved, it is often not necessary. Finally global conclusions are drawn.
The unanimous verdict of farmers in the sites visited was that ‘community-based trypanosomosis
control had never been tried, and is not to be recommended’ (page 11). This review is more
positive; it finds that in Burkina Faso many of the elements of community-based control have been
developed and implemented, and that this long, deep and worthwhile engagement has generated
important, valid and widely applicable lessons for the policy and practice of trypanosomosis
control in Burkina Faso and elsewhere.
Methodology
A literature review (published and grey) was carried out;
discussions were held with researchers; field visits were made
to four sites (from March to April 2002) where focus group
discussions were held with communities using semi-structured
questionnaires (100+ participants); farmer-researchers (41)
visited the same sites on a separate occasion; finally, the draft
document was circulated at different stages for comments and
corrections.
The review was greatly facilitated by the following process factors:
• Papers and working documents published by CIRDES on the projects
• Experience, expertise and assistance from CIRDES
• Farmer-researchers added to quantity and quality of data, and provided insights into
community perspectives that were inaccessible to scientist-researchers
• The approach of ‘advice seeking’ as an entry point to communities rather than ‘evaluation’ or
‘need identification’ avoided the pitfalls of the former (e.g. attribution of blame, exculpation)
and the latter (e.g. raising expectations, and biasing information towards eliciting assistance)
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In farmer participatory research,
the objects become the
protagonists; this empowers
farmers, is an effective learning
strategy, and gives access to
information otherwise
unobtainable.
Policies are rules that express goals and
provide rewards or sanctions to attain
them. Institutions are stable, recurring
patterns of behaviour that determine the
policies that are accepted and the way
that these policies are executed.
Organisations are structures of
recognised and accepted roles.
• Holding separate Focus Group Discussions (FGD) for elites and non-elites improved
participation, allowed triangulation and gave voice to non-elites.
The main constraints encountered were lack of project documentation and poor institutional
memory. For example, no internal or external evaluations, or detailed activity reports were
available for the review (because documentation didn’t exist or was with staff who had left). Poor
institutional memory was especially a problem with government and project partners.
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Picture 3 – Farmer Researchers from Kenedougou on a fact-finding mission to Mohoun
2. Projects in Burkina Faso
Overview of projects
Participative projects are rarely revisited after initial implementation4 and this review throws
interesting light on the ‘life after project’ scenario by looking at eight completed projects in
Burkina Faso, six of which had a major participatory component. The projects took place in the
south and west of Burkina Faso over 25 years and encompassed a wide range of farming systems,
institutions, partners and social conditions. They represent the quasi-totality of the tsetse control
projects in which CIRDES (a lead organisation in this field) had substantive involvement. Projects
implemented by other organisations are not explicitly addressed; however, from discussions with
expert opinion, it appears that sustainability was no better for these than for the projects described
here, and technical efficacy sometimes worse.
More details of the projects are given in annex 1; a brief summary is as follows:
• Bondukuy: Participative control in many agro-pastoralist villages implemented by an integrated
rural development program
• Dafinso: Participative control in a small village inhabited mainly by arable farmers
• Padema: Participative control in many agro-pastoral villages as part of an integrated rural
development program
• Satiri: Participative control in villages close to a wildlife reserve recently settled by Fulani
pastoralists and Mossi agro-pastoralists
• Samorogouan: Participative control in ranches designated for recently settled pastoralists
• Sideradougou: Non-participative tsetse eradication using sterile insects and barriers over a
large area
• Water department: Non-participative tsetse control on a small site
• Yale: Participative control in a zone designated for recently settled pastoralists, adjacent to a
wildlife reserve.
Approach to implementation
The approach to implementation of the participative projects was described by CIRDES as
follows7:
1.  Discussions with the farmers on the problems of animal health
2.  Entomological and epidemiological studies for at least eight months to evaluate the
importance of trypanosomosis
3.  Discussions with the farmers on the intervention strategies and their participation
4.  Intervention and monitoring
5.  Discussions with the farmers leading to their taking charge of the control
6.  Progressive disengagement by CIRDES
The intervention strategies used were in all cases a combination of traps/targets and animal baits,
and the institutions worked with at community level were in all cases associations of farmers. The
rest of the review will consider how farmers perceived, and contemporary accounts reported,
implementation as it actually occurred and impact resulting.
Effectiveness of control
The control strategies were very effective. Within four to six months both numbers of tsetse and
prevalence of trypanosomosis were greatly reduced, with a consequent decrease in clinical cases
and increase in animal health and condition (usually measured by the proxy of red blood cell
counts). In all sites visited (four out of six participative projects), farmers reported that benefits
were visible within three to six months. Factors associated with a longer time to appreciable
control include: smaller proportion of cattle treated, longer intervals between treatments, presence
of wildlife, large area of tsetse-cattle contact, species of tsetsea and the use of animal baits without
screens.
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Impact of control
All the projects were successful in controlling tsetse and delivered significant benefits to small
numbers of people, but lack of sustainability and lack of uptake outside the project area
necessarily reduced overall impacts.
Several important socio-economic studies demonstrated the impact of trypanosomosis control on
livelihoods and animal health8,9,10. Because retrospective baselines and recall methods were used,
the exact magnitude of effects is difficult to determine, but the presence of effects seems
unambiguous. Reported positive impacts in different studies include:
• Milk production increased
• Longer periods of animal traction
• Additional land cultivated
• Number of animals increased
• Less mortality of livestock
• More households keeping animals
• Fewer nuisance flies
• Less hand-labour needed.
Negative impacts reported by the socio-economic studies were few. Damage to crops by cattle
and increased conflicts between pastoralists and arable farmers were noticed but are an inevitable
by-product of the wished for and positive impact of increased cattle numbers and more
cattle-keeping households.
The finding that trypanocide expenditure increased with control is contra-intuitive. Most studies
on control report declines in drug use11,12,13,14, but other studies have reported increased use15 or no
change in drug use16. Possible explanations include the following:
• Poor correlation of perception of disease with existence of disease (the Knowledge Attitude
Practice baseline for the current project found that in some villages, disease was low but
treatment high and vice versa)
• Farmer accuracy of diagnosis declines with declining prevalence of disease
• The trypanosomosis crisis resulted in major financial hardship and so artificially depressed
expenditure on drugs and the ‘increase’ was in fact a rebound
• Treating animals is considered a socially desirable response and so was exaggerated by
respondents
• Information provision by the project led to higher use of drugs
These negative impacts do provide an important lesson; future projects should address rational
drug use and conflict resolution.
The sociological study at Yale found that a majority of farmers felt that the benefits for control
were evenly dispersed (only 10% felt that some had benefited more than others). It is a priori
predictable that people with more cattle will receive more substantial benefits than those with less,
and those without cattle will receive fewer and more indirect benefits; this is the finding of other
projects17. Women and the poor are thus less likely to benefit. In many traditional cultures, men
and elites are privileged and the exclusion of women and the poorest may be accepted and
un-remarked18, and this may be why farmers reported that benefits were evenly dispersed.
Alternatively, it may reflect a social desirability bias; farmers assume that equality of benefits is
socially desirable and so over-estimate levels.
Predicting success and sustainability
Despite considerable variation in local factors, all the projects in Burkina Faso were very effective
at controlling trypanosomosis and tsetse, but none of the projects were sustainable. The fact that
local factors have no predictive value in assessing success or long-term viability is interesting.
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a Glossina tachinoides is more persistent than Glossina palpalis
Some of the factors which might be expected to affect success and/or sustainability but in fact did
not are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Factors with no predicative value for effectiveness or sustainability of tsetse control
Factor Variability in factor
Land Use Predominantly cotton, cattle, food crops; transhumants, and sedentary
Ethnicity Peuls, Mossi, Senoufu, and Dioulu
Duration Autochthonous, recent in-migrants, and medium-term in-migrants
Partners State vet services, private vets, and development projects
Location Very remote, somewhat remote, and very close to large conurbation
Farmer involvement Minimum to major role in delivering strategies
Cost contribution None to full payment for ecto-parasiticides
Project length Two to twelve years
Community group CIRDES-organised, project-organised, and government-organised
A possible counterfactual is that if a high-level participatory approach had been used, efficacy
would be less than 100%, sustainability more than 0% and some of the above factors would have
predictive value.
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3. Lessons Learned: Essential elements of community trypanosomosis
control
The projects in Burkina Faso had many innovative features, strong points and examples of best
practice which deserve to be widely disseminated.
Integrating trypanosomosis control strategies
The projects were very successful in integrating trap/screen technology (killing tsetse with
insecticide treated traps or cloth screens) with animal bait technology (killing tsetse by cattle
treated with insecticide). This combination has powerful synergies which makes it highly
attractive. In the dry season, screens are very effective, especially at the end of the season when
tsetse concentrate near disappearing water sources. At this time, a few screens can inflict major
damage on tsetse populations. And in the rainy season, when screens are less effective (as flies
disperse and screens are liable to wash out (insecticide
removed) or wash away (rising rivers)), incentives to use
sprays are highest. Indeed, many farmers already use sprays
at this time to control ticks and tick-borne disease. Together,
screens and sprays are a winning combination, with a small
number of screens working hard in the dry season and tick
control cross-subsidising tsetse control in the rainy season.
Demand-driven interventions
In all projects, the need for trypanosomosis control was identified by the communities. In many
cases, they contacted a local intermediary who contacted CIRDES either directly or via state
veterinary services. If villagers spontaneously identify a problem and seek for assistance, problems
are probably real and urgent (as was the case at Satiri and Dafinso). If problems are identified with
the help of a general development agency (e.g. Padema), problems are likely to be real, but their
significance will be biased by community expectations and their prior experience of development.
Communities over-emphasise solutions they think external actors can supply (such as providing
infrastructure or free treatments) at the expense of solutions not requiring external resources19. The
least-best option (not seen in any of the projects, but common in many development programs) is
when a specialist external agency with resources
pre-allocated for a specific problem (e.g.
trypanosomosis control) goes to a community to see if
the problem exists. In this case, acknowledgement of
the problem by communities is more likely to reflect
their desire to access external resources than its real
importance. External agencies with a prior belief in the
importance of ‘their’ problem are liable to confirmatory
bias leading them to over-estimate its importance.
Broad stakeholder inclusion, narrow stakeholder control
Many of the projects involved a broad spectrum of stakeholders. In addition to those listed in
Table 3.1, CIRDES and government veterinary services were involved in all projects; development
projects were often also involved. Farmers recommended inclusion of the broader community,
transhumants (Peuls), human health services and informal animal health service providers. In two
projects private veterinarians were included, but this strategy was not recommended by farmers,
who said the services provided by veterinarians were unnecessary and overpriced.
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In the dry season, cattle go to where
flies are found (water) and treating the
fly predilection sites is very effective;
in the rainy season, flies seek cattle
and treating the cattle is very effective
(Cuissance et al. 1998).
Confirmatory bias - people seek
information that confirms their existing
beliefs, and disregard information that goes
against them, because changing hypotheses
requires cognitive effort, and because
people have difficulty in assessing negative
information (Evens, 1990).
Table 3.1. Communities’ (n=8) perception of who was involved and recommendations for who should be
involved
Actor Actually involved Should be involved
Transhumants 8 8
Human health services 6 8
Extension to all community 6 8
Informal private sector 1 8
Private vets 2 0
The projects realised the necessity of involving all the community. In Padema, for example, initial
high levels of theft and vandalism were successfully dealt with by a community-led extension
campaign. It is useful to identify the elements of the community most likely to come in contact
with, steal or damage screens (often children, poachers, fishermen, transhumants) and target
extension to them, using the most appropriate medium and message. Community theatre proved
successful for this in Kenya20.
Involving transhumant Peuls was problematic. They have the most animals, the most expertise and
the most interest in animal health, but only stay near villages for short periods (several weeks to
several months) and are reluctant to pay for year around protection, which they use only for part of
the year. They have considerable transaction costs in bringing animals to treatment points and
only do so if treatments are subsidised; otherwise they prefer to self-medicate. In many villages
there is tension (flaring up into occasional conflict) between agro-pastoralists and transhumants;
this makes collaboration difficult.
Although many stakeholders were included in the projects, substantive control of campaigns was
by a single stakeholder with a high incentive for success (usually CIRDES). This was a significant
factor in the high level of success achieved during the presence of CIRDES. Small, cohesive,
strongly motivated groups are more effective than large, heterogeneous and weakly motivated
groups in managing processes21.
Training in technical and management aspects
A strong point in all projects was the training given in tsetse control methods (this was usually
provided by CIRDES). Training was effective and appreciated by the villagers (Table 3.2). At
present most of the communities feel competent to carry out the technical aspects of using screens
and animal baits. They feel they understand the principles for making screens and impregnating
with insecticide, but most have forgotten the exact details of material specifications, dosages, and
treatment intervals.
Table 3.2. Training given in skills required for tsetse control, importance of skills and ability to perform them
as assessed by farmers (n=8 projects)
Skills Learned it Recommend it Could do it now
Making and treating screens 1 All 1*
Placing# and maintaining screens 8 All 8
Obtaining sprays / PO 0 All 8
Using sprays or pour-ons 6 All 8
Notes: *The remaining 7 groups felt they would be competent do it if given training.
# Means physically putting in place screens (not identification of sites)
Training was not given in sourcing treatments (e.g. knowing where to buy medicines and judging
medicine quality and appropriateness), but farmers felt that this topic should be included. In
several villages, additional (often informal) training was given on use of medicines, diagnosing
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trypanosomosis and causes of trypanosomosis. This was highly appreciated. Training in
management aspects was not always provided, but communities said it should be.
Farmer-to-farmer extension
In all of the participative projects visited, farmers visited other projects to learn from communities
involved in tsetse control programs. Information provided by farmers is often more convincing and
accessible than information provided by outside agencies22. Seeing control strategies in action is
more effective than hearing about them. All the respondents felt that farmer-to-farmer extension
was important and recommended its inclusion in other projects.
Localising skills in communities
A sustainability spectrum is evident in the projects, with emphasis on sustainability increasing over
time. Strategies varied from delivering and placing screens in the communities free of charge
(Siderodougou), to expecting a contribution from communities for screens made and delivered by
the project (Bodukuy, Dafinso, Satiri start), to enabling villagers to treat screens with insecticides
and place them (Padema, Satiri end). In several of the projects, local tailors were trained in making
screens (Satiri, Padema). In Padema, villagers undertook the placing of screens themselves. That
communities have the confidence and competence to carry out control strategies without external
support is both a tribute to the training giving by CIRDES and a pre-requisite for sustainability.
Technical competence
CIRDES provided technical backstopping for all the projects reviewed. The quality and efficacy of
this support is demonstrated by the rapid and comprehensive success achieved in reducing tsetse
numbers, reducing trypanosomosis prevalence and increasing red blood cell levels in all sites.
Technical efficacy was perhaps the least problematic aspect of the projects. When activities are
uniformly successful and trouble-free, it is easy to undervalue them. However reviews of projects
indicate that technical adequacy is by no means automatic (or even common). Potential fail-points
seen in other projects include, but are not limited to, the following23:
• Insufficient number of screens/traps resulting in inadequate control
• Too many screens/traps resulting in waste of resources
• Screens of the wrong material, colour, shape or size
• Screens/traps inappropriate for the species of tsetse present
• Screens/traps put in the wrong places, or in the wrong season
• Failure to maintain screens/traps, re-impregnate them with insecticide, or follow schedules
• Using unsuitable or insufficient insecticides/attractants
• Using expensive, complicated technology when cheap, simple technology is available
• Treating too many cattle (wasting resources) or too few (ineffective)
• Treating cattle too often or too infrequently
• Using insecticides in ways that put human health at risk or damage the environment
• Failing to dispose properly of insecticide containers
• Using unsuitable or insufficient sprays or pour-ons.
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Technical adequacy is a non-negotiable for trypanosomosis control; its absence cannot be compensated for
by participation.
Community contributes financially to trypanosomosis control
For sustainability, the community must pay for trypanosomosis control itself or find an actor
willing to underwrite long term costs (such as government, local NGO or church group). The
second strategy works reasonably well for the provision of human health and education and for
the provision of some animal health services24, but it seems to be difficult to find patrons for
open-ended tsetse control. All the participative projects in Burkina Faso had some element of
community contribution, whether in cash or kind. (But contributions were usually less than
promised or planned and in all cases were insufficient to fund operations after the departure of the
project.)
Long-term repeated interactions and good relations with communities
Community development is considered to require long-term
engagement, trust, mutual respect and commitment25. In all the
projects visited, communities reported a relationship with
CIRDES that was positive (if not close). Communities’ active
participation and collaboration in the review (more than 100
participants) was an indicator of their good relation with CIRDES. All communities wanted
relations with CIRDES to continue. (This was not the case for all the external agents, several of
whom received very bad ‘report cards’ from communities, with poor governance and lack of
competence being reported for more than one). In most projects there was support from external
agencies for several years, and CIRDES showed commendable commitment to keep working with
communities in the face of difficulties. (However, in one case there was evidence of premature
disengagement from communities and subsequent lack of closure). The downside of long
engagement (especially in the absence of phased and planned transfer of responsibilities) is the
creation of dependency and learned helplessness; this may have occurred in some projects.
Table 3.3. Duration of intervention (years)
Bondukuy Dafinso Padema Samorogouan Satiri Yale
3 years 3 years 6 years 5 years 8 years 4 years
Interventions backed with rigorous entomological, epidemiological and
socio-economic studies
It is unusual for development projects to convincingly demonstrate impact. Martin (2001)
examined 300 papers in a meta-review of the impact of community animal health projects; only
29 papers had sufficient information on impact to allow analysis, and only 9 had carried out an
economic analysis26. A more recent review of over 70 animal health programs in developing
countries, found that while 62% of programs provided information on impact, much of this was
anecdotal or self-evaluation27. Through linking interventions with epidemiological, entomological
and socio-economic surveys, CIRDES was able to unambiguously demonstrate the effectiveness of
the control strategies and the positive impacts on animal health. The many published papers on
the control programs reflect the quality and quantity of research contributions.
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If there are any future projects, we
ask that CIRDES work directly with
us and not through intermediaries.
FGD, Padema
4. Three pillars of sustainable community trypanosomosis control
The three pillars for sustainable community trypanosomosis control are:
• Farmers can do it themselves
• Farmers can manage it themselves
• Farmers can pay for it themselves.
While many projects addressed some of these, none succeeded in delivering all of these.
Doing trypanosomosis control: Internalising all the competencies needed for
control
Much emphasis was placed on building skills and knowledge, and much success was achieved.
However there was little evidence of a holistic vision of the inter-dependent competencies
necessary for continued control; it is not enough for farmers to have some of the skills needed,
they must have all the skills; the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Consumer skills (such
as wise buying and assessing drug quality) were neglected. If all skills
cannot be provided, then the cost effectiveness of providing some skills
is questionable. It can be seen from Table 4.1 that in no case did
communities feel confident to carry out all the activities needed for
control.
Table 4.1. Farmer assessment of their ability to perform vector control activities in 8
vector control projects
Activity Ability to perform
Generate or obtain finance for vector control 0*
Source the material and insecticide for screens 2
Construct screens and treat them with insecticide 1
Identify the sites for screen placement 2
Place, check and repair screens as necessary 5
Educate the community to prevent theft and loss 6
Source sprays and pour-ons 7
Treat cattle with sprays/pour-ons 8
*Ranging from 0 = not competent, to 8 = fully competent
Certain types of technical information are difficult to internalise and retain (e.g. dosages, treatment
schedules and protocols). Even those projects that did train farmers did not leave reference
information with the community; unsurprisingly those trained forgot the details. Leaving
easy-to-understand information is especially important in trypanosomosis control as chemicals
used can damage human and animal health or the environment if used incorrectly.
Managing control: Substantive management by community
For communities to take over management of control, they need to acquire and put in practice
management skills. However, in all of the projects visited, communities reported that management
was by outsiders. Most of these projects had community management structures such as village
associations and apex organisations; interestingly, in all cases established by external agencies. In
order to find out how much power villagers and their associations actually had, a diagnostic tool
was used based on the project cycle. Communities were asked to identify the principal actor at
each stage, using concrete examples of the tasks and decisions involved. The results are given in
Table 4.2. This table goes a long way in explaining why participative trypanosomosis control
projects in Burkina Faso were not sustainable.
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They only showed us
half the picture. FGD
Padema
Table 4.2. Villager perceptions of who was in charge of different steps in the project cycle (n=8 projects)
Step in project cycle Villagers in charge Outsiders in charge
Identification 6 2
Planning 0 8
Management 0 8
Activities 5 3
Monitoring 2 6
Hand over NOT DONE
Sometimes the community reported that they were involved or consulted, or even responsible for
outsider-determined (usually minor) management tasks. But when they were asked who had
central responsibility for major decision-making and substantive control, the community felt in all
cases it was an external agent. (This was also the perception of CIRDES staff interviewed.) This
level of participation corresponds to ‘functional participation’; its primary objective is to facilitate
management by external agencies and it is not likely to result in sustainability28.
Where technical feasibility questions remain unanswered, it may be justifiable for the project to
manage control in the initial phases. If this option is followed, then a planned and structured
handover is needed. This should include an induction to all the skills needed for managing
control, and a learning period in which communities have sole responsibility for control but with
external agencies available for guidance and support. In none of the projects did the community
report a structured handover of the control program to the community (Table 4.2). In some cases,
the community perception was that the project “just left”. In others, there was a belief (or promise)
that another project would come. In one, there was breakdown of relations after communities
were unable to pay back a loan they, arguably, should not have been given. Internal documents
and published papers indicate that there was considerable concern about sustainability, but, it
seems that it was not possible to put in place a structured handover in any of the projects, or
communicate concern to those most affected – the farmers. In the absence of planned devolution,
communities are very unlikely to spontaneously develop the skills needed to manage control. Even
when communities were left with the technical competencies and the materials for control, as was
the case in Padema and Bondukuy, they did not continue with control because they had not been
given the institutional competencies, that is the opportunity to develop the management skills for
running and financing control.
Control costs too much: Mal-alignment of strategies and resource base
Most control strategies have start-up and recurrent costs (including depreciation for capital
expenditure such as pumps and screens). For sustainability only recurrent costs are relevant29.
Villagers must meet these themselves or find another
actor who is willing to do this. If the recurrent costs are
beyond beneficiaries’ willingness or ability to pay, the
strategy is ipso facto unsustainable. Researchers often
regard animal baits and traps/screens as low-cost
methods30, but all the communities visited considered
that the costs of screens and regularly spraying a
majority of animals were beyond their capacity to pay.
This has also been noticed by studies in East Africa. 31
Establishing what is affordable and value for money from the perspective of farmers can be
difficult. Methods for predicting contributions include; asking for contributions, contingent
valuation, revealed behaviour and estimates based on assessment of the benefits of control.
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The very strong preference of farmers for
low-cost control strategies can be seen in
Padema where farmers were given the
choice between pour-ons (more
convenient and considered by farmers to
be more effective) and sprays (cheaper);
86% of farmers chose sprays.
Community pledges were used in some projects to estimate contributions. That these were rarely
met underlines the fact that little reliance can be placed on promises “to meet all the costs” made
at initial meetings. Detailed, high-level-participatory budgeting, which can increase the likelihood
of promised contributions being met, was not reported to have been done in any project.
Contingent valuation was carried out in Yale, Samorogouan and Satiri. All of these studies
indicated that the majority of people were willing to contribute but events proved that actual
contributions were much lower than pledged contributions32. It seems that contingent valuation is
a strong indicator for community satisfaction and positive attitude towards control, and gives a
useful guide to the upper limit for contributions but is not yet an accurate predictor of actual
contributions. Revealed behaviour should be a better guide than hypothesised behaviour, but (as
is common in community trypanosomosis control33) none of the projects in Burkina Faso charged
realistic prices for services rendered. Where real world charges are applied, it is unusual for most
or even many animals to be presented. In Yale, introducing charges for pour-ons led to a sharp
drop in numbers presented. A village association in Kotoura charges full price for sprays, with the
result that only 50 animals out of 600 are regularly presented34. In Ethiopia, when 100% cost
recovery was used, around 25% of animals were presented for treatment (the 100% cost recovery
includes a subsidy of unknown amount)35. Farmers in the present review reported that when
projects started raising prices to reflect real costs, their interest in continued participation declined.
Current expenditure on trypanosomosis control is another way of estimating how much farmers
may pay for control. This review and other studies in Burkina36 indicate that farmers pay
considerable amounts on treating and preventing trypanosomosis.
Important lessons to be learned from the projects’ strong points and weak points include:
• Expensive methods should be avoided when less expensive ones are available
• Costs should be kept low by reducing control intensity to the lowest effective level
• Community contributions are best estimated by revealed behaviour or current expenditure on
control
• It is better to invest time in carrying out detailed cost analysis and participative budgeting with
communities rather than relying on non-specific pledges to meet costs.
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5. Managing threats to sustainability
The fail-points outlined in the last section can be guaranteed to generate un-sustainability. If
farmers can’t afford community-based trypanosomosis control, or don’t know how to do it, or
can’t manage the process, then control will not continue when the project goes. However there
are also some process factors which can have profound effects on sustainability.
Pseudo-participation and ritual participation
The participatory approach was partly a reaction to the poor performance and sustainability of
conventional top-down, expert-led, etic development projects37 . It was acknowledged that lack of
participation was a key factor in this failure38. As a result,
participation has become a development panacea,
adopted by all major development agencies; projects
that are not ‘participatory, bottom-up, sustainable,
farmer-led, grass roots, people-centred,
livelihood-enhancing, etc.’39 are now the exception
rather than the rule. Rapid expansion and ideological
hegemony has inevitable draw-backs. One of these is soi
disant participatory projects which lack knowledge of
participatory principles, processes and methodologies40;
in other words pseudo-participatory projects. Participation occurs at the lower levels (Table 5.1) of
enquiring, paid-for or functional participation23. There are also cultural differences in the
conceptualisation of participation. Francophone actors tend to use participation in the
non-transformative sense of educating, informing or involving people41,42, while Anglophone
development practitioners use participation almost exclusively in the transformative sense of
changing institutions43,44.
Table 5.1. Different types of participation45
Participation Involvement of communities Power of communities Sustainability
Passive People are told that a project is
happening in their area.
No power over project.
No community
involvement in
activities,
sustainability not
possible.
Extractive People answer questions in an extractive
one-way process. Results are not shared
with communities.
Power to opt out.
Enquiring People are consulted by external agents.
Discourse is two-way. External agents
define problems and solutions but may
modify them as a result of community
views.
Power to opt out.
Power to disagree.
Paid for People provide resources or labour in
return for incentives e.g. contribute
labour for subsidised screens, bring cattle
for subsidised treatments.
Power to withhold
involvement, bargain for
more incentives.
Activities stop when
incentives end.
Functional People participate by forming groups to
meet pre-determined project objectives.
Power to make minor
decisions and ‘right’
decisions.
Usually depends on
outside facilitators,
may continue.
Interactive People participate in joint analysis and in
forming new or transforming existing
institutions. They have real control over
decision-making.
Power to make all decisions,
project may pressurise to
make ‘right’ decisions.
Groups have a stake
in maintaining
culture or practice.
Self-
mobilisation
People take the initiative to form and
transform institutions independently of
the external agent. External agent
provides advice.
Power to make ‘wrong’
decisions, project only
advises.
People have a stake
to continue.
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Projects come to a village with a lot of
activities. They have just built a school so
of course the people bring their cattle.
They keep bringing their cattle for a while,
because who knows, the project may build
a dispensary. There is no real interest in
bringing their cattle and after the project
leaves, they stop. Key informant interview.
A second problem is Ritual Participation, as we
may style participatory projects which incorporate
the processes and methodologies of high-level
participation but not the principles. This is partly the
result of a rapid expansion of Participatory
Approaches resulting in mechanised execution, lack
of quality, perfunctory analyses, and the use of
techniques without understanding principles46.
There are strong incentives for using participatory
vocabulary and paraphernalia in terms of better
access to donor funding, but adopting participatory
principles involves fundamental changes in attitude and behaviour and substantial hand-over of
power, something which may be more difficult and less attractive to project implementers47. The
result is that some external agents acquire the shadow of participation, without the substance; both
beneficiaries and implementers may say and even believe they are engaged in participatory
development but in fact the process is externally driven and disempowering48.
Participation is not the only development approach or inevitably the best49. Participation has costs
and externally-led or directive approaches may be better for certain situations, for example in
eradicating an isolated population of tsetse, or in emergencies. What should be avoided are
externally led, top-down approaches that say or think they are community-based and high-level
participatory. This leads to confusion, failure to meet objectives and disappointment on all sides.
When the word ‘participation’ is used, it should always be qualified50. In most of the projects in
Burkina Faso, community involvement was at the information-giving, extractive, paid-for or
functional levels. Community development practitioners do not consider these projects to be
high-level participatory or sustainable.
Managing participation:
• It is important to identify the level of participation used and communicate this to all project
stakeholders. Classifications for this are widely used and available (see Table 5.1 for an
example)
• If a high-level participatory approach is chosen, the external agency must be prepared to invest
the time, resources, training and additional effort needed for this
• If a high-level participatory approach is planned, there should be competency in community
development and social science in addition to technical issues.
Token cost-sharing, entrenched subsidies and underwriting delivery costs
In many of the projects, the contributions of farmers were small and less than anticipated. If
farmers are meeting 75–90% of costs, it is reasonable to expect that they will be able to increase
this to 100% when the project leaves; however if farmers are meeting 20% of the costs, it is by no
means certain that they will be willing or able to pay real prices.
Table 5.2. Real costs, planned costs, and paid costs in three participatory vector control projects
Real cost Intended cost-sharing Actual contribution reported
Bondukuy Screens: 3 000 000 FCFA
Spray: 75 FCFA
Pour-on: 350 FCFA
None
Spray: 75 FCFA
Pour-on: 350 FCFA
None
Spray: 30 FCFA
Pour-on:40 FCFA
Dafinso Traps: 200 000 FCFA
Treatments: 75-350 FCFA
100 000 FCFA
30-75 FCFA
None
None
Padema Screens: 4 000 000 FCFA
Treatments: 325 FCFA
70% of the costs
Nearly all the costs
30% of cost (50% in year 1)
30% of cost (Berenil® was free)
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One self-styled community-managed project
used all the formulae of participation, such as
problem trees, village committees, workshops,
stakeholder meetings etc. On discussion it
emerged that not only had the community no
control over project decisions (except the most
trivial), but the external agency was able to
insist that farmers’ own money was spent on
services farmers felt were unnecessary and bad
value for money. FGD
Subsidies are very popular with farmers and resisting demands for subsidies is difficult, especially
for external agents with a research rather than development agenda51. However the negative effects
of subsidies are well known (anti-poor, self-perpetuating, encouraging irrational use and waste,
damaging or suppressing the private sector); in short, if sustainability is an objective, subsidies are
best avoided.
Indirect subsidies should also be addressed. Projects often report the price of the trypanosomosis
control drug as the price it cost the project to bulk-buy in large conurbations. This does not take
into account the costs of getting the product from point of sale to point of use, the fact that
delivery costs are likely to be higher for the private sector than for the external agencies, the fact
that poor farmers don’t buy in bulk, and the fact that profits are necessary to incentivise delivery.
The result was that prices cited for control probably underestimated real costs by as much as
several hundred percent. (One study in Kenya showed that in remote areas the market price for
animal health products was 200–300% of the capital city price, so development organisations
using 100% cost recovery (based on capital city procurement in bulk prices) were effectively
providing a subsidy of more than 50%52).
Managing low contributions:
• Move quickly to real prices; if farmers cannot afford these, then change the strategies
• Move quickly to real delivery systems; temporary external agents should not be responsible for
delivering drugs and treatments
• Include realistic delivery costs in prices: not what it costs the project, but what it would cost
the farmer
• Assess the effect of service delivery on the private sector (formal and informal) and avoid
delivery systems that damage or inhibit the development of the private sector (formal and
informal).
Co-dependency
Historically, civil society (e.g. NGOs, private
voluntary organisations, community groups) has
shown the greatest interest and competence in
participatory approaches, congruent with their
people–oriented organisational culture53. Most of
the projects in this review were led by research institutions or parastatal projects, characterised by
task-oriented and hierarchical cultures, respectively54. These cultures often have difficulties with
participatory processes. Research institutions may find participation adds cost, slows results,
compromises scientific protocols and muddies data. Hierarchies may find participation is not
easily standardised, lacks respect, subverts the system and requires stressful deviations from
procedure. Both research institutions and state/parastatal institutions have incentives and
preferences to manage the process themselves. (Moreover, management gives control over
resource flows with obvious perverse incentives for misappropriation; in more than one project
there was evidence of governance problems.)
Not only do external agencies have preferences for managing, communities may also have
preferences for being managed55. An unexpected result of the study was that in all sites visited,
farmers said that management should not be given to the community or farmers. There are several
contributing factors to this. Firstly management is difficult and time consuming. Taking on
management functions may also lead to problems with village politics. Villagers felt they lacked in
skills in management, and are used to having development interventions managed by outsiders.
The fact that none of the activities were sustainable, despite the presence of village associations in
all villages, may also have reduced their faith in community management. Finally, it may be an
indication of governance problems and consequent low social capital at community level56.
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Organizational culture is an emergent quality
that encompasses values, behaviour, norms,
goals, priorities, and ways of thinking of
organizations.
This combination of an implementing agency with a preference for management and communities
with a preference for being managed leads to co-dependency or voluntary dis-empowerment. In
the short term, this collusion meets important needs of both the community and the external
agency. In the long term, it vitiates the possibility of sustainable, community-managed systems.
Managing co-dependency:
• External agencies should take their organisational structure and culture into account when
deciding the appropriate level of participation. Highly-centralised, bureaucratic, hierarchic or
individualistic organisational cultures are not well suited to participatory community
development57.
• Understanding the dynamics of participation is necessary.
• Empowerment is not an easy option for the project or the community, but it is likely to be the
‘best-bet’ for sustainability and arguably the most ethical approach to development.
Fragile institutions, perverse incentives
None of the projects used systems that were capable of delivering control after the withdrawal of
the project. Systems used were either of known low sustainability (such as government, project, or
existing village groups) or new institutions whose sustainability and appropriateness for village
conditions was unproven (such as private veterinarians). De novo systems invariably (and
predictably?) proved unsustainable58.
Table 5.3. Animal health service delivery institutions compared
Institution Sustainability Farmers reached Problems
Government Low, government has withdrawn from
service provision
Many Resource constraints,
governance, quality
Projects Low, no mandate for long-term service
provision
Few Cover, accountability,
ownership, high cost
Private veterinarians Low, only small numbers, in towns,
oriented to drug sales
Few in the case of
services, many for
drugs
Services too expensive
for most poor farmers
Village groups Low, most require external support Many Governance, capacity,
quality
Informal private sector Potentially high, services aligned with
ability to pay
Very many Not legal, low quality
Farmers High, greatest incentive to treat sick
animals
All Lower quality
In order to maximise long-term effects, the best bet should be to work with the institutions that
existed before and will continue after the project (in addition to the institutions innovated by the
project). If this is done, even if exogenous strategies fail to take root, long-term benefits are likely.
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the paradox of health provision in Africa:
legitimate systems are unsustainable and sustainable systems are illegitimate. In Burkina Faso, as
in most developing countries, the majority of animal (and human) health services are delivered by
the non-professional private sector (the informal or extra-legal sector)59. This system is the only one
which has been able to deliver sustainable, affordable products on a wide scale, although quality
and legitimacy are often called into question and with some justification. This paradox of health
provision is a policy problem and it is entirely understandable that a project when faced with the
choice of unsustainable and legitimate systems or sustainable but quasi-legitimate systems should
opt for the former. However, by doing so, the projects greatly and predictably reduced the
probability of delivering continuing substantial streams of benefits.
The systems with which projects worked were often fragile or included perverse incentives.
Proofing systems against perverse incentives and mal-governance is always difficult and often
futile, entailing an arms race in which abuse remains one step ahead of procedures to contain it,
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and scarce resources are increasingly diverted from activities to policing. Costs of containing
corruption are transaction costs, and as such are dead losses from which no one benefits. Some
systems are notoriously prone to abuse and difficult to manage, especially those involving money.
Systems which caused problems in the projects under review included:
• Credit: Giving loans to communities is a highly specialised area – organisations without
expertise in this domain invariably have difficulties with cost recovery. In one project, a fragile
community association was given a large loan for screens. Their predict inability to pay led to
the premature end of the project. Tears all round, but was the community or lender to blame?
• Revolving funds: In several cases, revolving funds were involved (and dissolved). Revolving
funds have a poor record of sustainability and require high levels of supervision. Although they
often work well with external support, there are high incentives for misappropriation and they
usually fail when projects withdraw60.
• Merry go rounds are more sustainable and institutionally
performing.
• Unrealistic entitlements: In one project, people attending
meetings were given per diems and farmers paid 1000
FCFA a day for removing screens. Paying high prices for
activities routinely carried out free-of-charge in similar
projects is unsustainable (for comparison, the standard
day wage in this areas was 500 FCFA).
• Delivery systems: In at least one project, private vets were given a monopoly on treatment
provision, despite the fact that there was no history of vets providing treatments at farm level,
no need for vets to provide treatments (ectoparasites), no demand for vets to provide treatments
and no possibility of vets providing treatments after the end of the project.
Managing system failures
• Systems need to be analysed from the perspective of incentives, as people rarely act against
their interests.
• Systems that are almost always problematic (such as credit, revolving funds) or that have yet to
take off (e.g. private veterinary services in rural areas) should not be integral parts of control,
especially by naïve organisations.
• Systems that can self-correct should be used as far as possible. For example, governance
problems are less in systems which include competition, allow people to make choices, foster
information flow and give opportunities for repeated, voluntary, interactions.
• Micro-meso-macro linkages should be incorporated so that the problems experienced by
projects delivering services on the ground are brought to the attention of policy makers.
18
Private veterinarians adopted the same
extortionate behaviour that had been
criticised in public services …. tailors
used the material given to them for
screens to make clothes with.....
(Bontoulougou et al., 2000)
Picture 4. Farmers visiting CIRDES
6. Misconceptions and misinformation
The review revealed a relatively poor volume and flow of information between actors. In particular
it identified widespread misconceptions that seriously jeopardise sustainability. These are the
erroneous beliefs that:
• Trypanosomosis has many important causes besides tsetse
• Trypanocides are still needed after tsetse is controlled
• When tsetse are gone, they don’t come back
• Sprays and pour-ons work by protecting individual cattle from tsetse
• Drugs are highly effective against trypanosomosis.
Although the projects all had an element of education and gave information on the causes and
control of trypanosomosis, these specific sustainability-damaging false beliefs were not effectively
addressed. They are also widespread in Kenedougou, and future control efforts will have to pass
the following five essential messages to all stakeholders.
Animal sleeping sickness is caused only by tsetse
All farmers recognise that tsetse cause trypanosomosis. However, the disease usually translated by
trypanosomosis (soumaya) is also believed to have other causes, especially cold shaded water,
poisoning by plants, ticks and other flies. Farmers who believe that trypanosomosis has many
causes have less incentive in investing in control which only addresses one of the causes, and are
likely to go on treating even after tsetse have been trapped out.
After flies are controlled, there is no need to use trypanocides
Farmers continued to use trypanocides at relatively high levels after the successful control of tsetse.
The indications for treatment after successful control are in fact fewa and drug usage reported by
farmers is higher than levels needed for legitimate indications; for example in Yale, a household
survey found substantial use of trypanocides at times when disease was very low8. Continued high
spending on trypanocides in addition to vector control dramatically reduces farmers’ interest,
paying for vector control.
Control must continue, but can be down-scaled
As the campaign progressed and the disease fell to low levels, farmers thought flies had gone for
good—obviously, a disincentive for continuing with control. Farmers did not realise there is
continuous re-invasion pressure and control is a long-term commitment. Neither did they
understand that it is easier to keep tsetse populations low once populations have been reduced.
The misperception that continued control entailed the initial high levels of expenditure and effort
ad infinitum was another disincentive to continuing.
Sprays and pour-ons are used to kill flies, not to protect cattle
Farmers see the treated animal as ‘an individual protected’, rather than ‘a component in a vector
control strategy’. They can easily see that screens are intended to kill flies and the fact that the
cloth is protected is an irrelevant side effect. But they do not realise the same logic lies behind the
idea of spraying cattle. Farmers think that by spraying their animals, they will protect the animals
sprayed, not realising that cattle are sprayed not to protect the individual but to kill tsetse. Farmers
who see spraying as an individual rather than a group strategy will not see the need for
synchronising treatments, or treating a critical number of animals.
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a Mainly breakthrough cases, clinically diagnosed babesiosis or trichomoniasis and protecting animals who move outside controlled
zones
Multiple Drug Resistance
Failure to respond to treatment can have many causes: use of the wrong drug, incorrect usage,
sub-standard products, a compromised host immune system, highly pathogenic infection, etc.61
However Multiple Drug Resistance is an emerging problem which is increasingly likely to be a
factor in treatment failure. Farmers are unaware of MDR36 and don’t realise that if it exists, giving
more treatments is ineffective and will accelerate the spread of resistance.
High levels of Multiple Drug Resistance require vector control
When levels of drug resistance are high, the only feasible option is vector control. The example of
Samorogouan shows that even using drugs at very high dosages and short intervals has no
benefit62. This was also the case in a ranch in Tanzania. Farmers believe they will always have the
fall-back option of drugs, a disincentive to commit to vector control.
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7. Integrating trypanosomosis control
One of the most successful aspects of CIRDES interventions reviewed was the integration of animal
bait (sprays and pour-ons) with traps/screens. Other aspects of integration were addressed by other
actors or unaddressed.
Endogenous control strategies
This review and other works in Burkina reveal a rich repertoire of endogenous control methods:
methods which are used spontaneously, which were there before the presence of the project and
which continued after the project (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1. Endogenous trypanosomosis control in communities visited
Strategies widely used by communities include:
• DIM as a curative
• DIM as a preventative
• DIM as a general tonic
• ISMM as a preventative
• ISMM as a general tonic
• Insecticide sprays on individual animals for
tick control
• Herbs and plant medicines
• Firing (cauterisation)
• Prayer and metaphysical remedies
• Non canonical modern remedies
• Avoiding areas with many flies
• Using wells/pumps for watering cattle
Strategies less widely used by communities
• Pour-on insecticide for individual animals
• ISMM as a curative
Strategies no longer used by communities
• Pour-on for > 40% of animals at the same
time
• Sprays for > 40% of animals at the same
time
• Screens
• Traps
Strategies never used by communities
• Increasing the numbers of trypanotolerant
cattle
Although the projects did not explicitly address these strategies, it would seem that integrating with
endogenous strategies is a best-bet for sustainability. However many endogenous strategies have
mal-adaptive elements.
Integrating with other livestock issues
Farmers were asked if trypanosomosis control should be an independent issue or should be
combined with interventions focussed on other livestock concerns. All farmers said that it should
be combined. All farmers also said that farmer groups should have the objective of general
livestock development rather than just trypanosomosis control, or even just animal health.
Although preferred by farmers, integration is not always easy to deliver and all CIRDES
interventions had the single focus of trypanosomosis control. Table 7.2 shows that farmers have
many livestock concerns, and trypanosomosis is not the only, and rarely the most important,
animal health issue. Problems, of course, may be interlinked: for example, lack of water, bush fires
and land tenure problems force cattle to move to areas at high risk for trypanosomosis.
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Table 7.2. Problems with livestock in order of decreasing magnitude as perceived by farmers in four
communities
Bondukuy Satiri Padema Dafinso
Lack of water Lack of pasture Lack of cattle holding grounds Trypanosomosis
Bush fires Bush fires Lack of water Lack of water
Land tenure problems Lack of a pastoralist charter Land tenure problems Lack of pasture
Tsetse and trypanosomosis Lack of water Trypanosomosis
Lack of pasture Tsetse
Conflict with park guards Animal numbers are declining
Lack of cattle holding grounds Lack of milk
Farmers were also asked if trypanosomosis control should be combined with other development
issues (such as gender, education and infrastructure). They unanimously said that it should not be,
perhaps reflecting their concern over loss of focus as a corollary of broadening objectives.
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8. Why control didn’t last: Reality, perception and development narratives
In all the projects in Burkina Faso, the control strategies introduced by external agencies have not
been maintained; tsetse and trypanosomosis have recurred, and are once more a major problem.
This experience is not atypical for community control63. The failure is obviously disappointing for
those involved, both external agencies and communities. This section looks at reasons suggested
by external agencies and communities, and analyses them in terms of explanatory power,
helpfulness and verisimilitude. Belief systems are an important determinant for openness to, and
acceptability of, innovation and understanding explanatory narratives gives insights to these
relationships.
External agents explanatory narratives
Blaming the communities: One way of
explaining the failure of control strategies is
to locate responsibility for failure within the
communities. From this perspective,
communities are disingenuous, self-seeking,
manipulative and exploitative; they make
promises which they do not deliver on, are
only interested in external agencies as sources
of resources, and have to be paid to participate. Communities are irrational (it would be in their
interests to continue with control but they do not realise this) or perverse (it would be in their
interests to continue with control; they know this, but choose not to continue.)
This ‘blame the victim’ narrative is a normal and common way of dealing with disappointment.
However it is problematic from several aspects. It has little explanatory power as all lack of
success is indiscriminately attributed to community-side factors. A theory which explains
everything, effectively explains nothing. It is not consistent with documented facts, which show
communities often invest substantially in their development64. Finally it is unhelpful: by decreasing
trust and social capital between outsiders and communities, it both raises the costs of interactions
and lowers the chance of success. This narrative often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; outsiders
with low expectations of communities give them only token say in decision-making, and rush to
pay for participation without fully investigating more sustainable options. The provision of
incentives becomes self-perpetuating, and creates a sense of entitlement which makes it difficult to
shift to a market-based system, Communities, excluded from decision-making and habituated to
being paid to participate, become cynical and develop a ‘what’s in it for me’ approach to working
with projects.
Reconstruct the past: Once a project has finished and failed to deliver the anticipated results, or
when it is in progress but obviously not on track to achieve Log Frame Goals, there is a strong
incentive to downsize or re-write the initial objectives. Projects which started out as ‘eradication’
morph into ‘control’, and ‘continent-wide’ programs end up working in a few accessible sites
(road-side bias). Re-engineering in the course of a project is an unexceptional, arguably
commendable, attempt to adapt to the real world situation. However this strategy is maladaptive
when applied retrospectively. Projects are demonstrably not sustainable; it is later claimed that
sustainability was not an objective and that the program was about research not development. This
is often contradicted by contemporary literature and documentation which reveal that
sustainability was intended and anticipated. Re-invention of the past can be explained by the
theory of cognitive dissonance65. The belief that goals have not been met is in conflict with the
belief that meeting goals is important and a reflection of personal worth; the incompatibility
induces cognitive dissonance, which is resolved by changing the most expendable belief, often the
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Participation has often centred on encouraging local
people to sell their time or effort in return for cash, or
goods or services. Paying for participation distorts
perceptions, creates dependencies, and gives the
misleading impression that local people are supportive
of externally driven initiatives. These approaches are
inevitably unsustainable. (Pretty, 1997)
belief that ‘we thought it would work’. This narrative is not helpful as it prevents learning, and has
little verisimilitude.
Approach problems: Many commentators attribute the low sustainability of participative programs
to approach failures. Kamuanga (2003) found that most projects in Burkina Faso had a top-down
approach66 , and this, development theorists argue, is not compatible with sustainability67. A review
comparing community trypanosomosis control with community animal health provision attributed
low sustainability of the former to approach errors (viz. reliance on state rather than indigenous
structures; not using participatory methodologies for problem identification or planning; top-down
approaches; community participation only at a low level; professional bias)63. Other authors have
suggested the lack of social sciences inputs has had negative effects on sustainability68. The
argument is that if things were done differently (more social-science, more participation, more
empowerment), then the results would be different.
This review partially supports the ‘wrong approach’ narrative. The projects in Burkina Faso
deviated widely from the participatory community-based model currently hypothesised to be
necessary for sustainable development. This is a helpful narrative as it encourages lesson learning
and improvement (although it can have the negative effect of antagonising technical professionals);
it is also potentially falsifiable and as such has explanatory power, and has verisimilitude.
Inherent unsuitability: Some commentators believe that there are intrinsic features which make
community control of tsetse an implausible aspiration. McCarthy et al.69, by combining an
economic model for trypanosomosis control with game theory models, argued that the
combination of the public good nature of community control plus an underlying prisoner’s
dilemma incentive structure meant that community-based trypanosomosis control might be
intrinsically unsustainable. It is patent that tsetse control has inherent challenges to sustainability
being:
• Non-excludable, so there is an incentive to be a ‘free rider’ and leave control to others.
• Non rival, so consumption cannot be measured, making it difficult to collect user fees or
payments.
• A bulk good which cannot be
conveniently sub-divided and bought
when needed. Poor consumers have
strong preferences for buying in small
amounts at higher prices in times of
need.
Tsetse control is vulnerable to:
• Time consistency problems: farmers are
more willing to pay for prevention when
it is too late and less willing to pay
when it is effective.
• Agent-principal problems: vector control
is usually managed by a committee/village association. The committee has incentives to
under-perform, and members knowing this and not being able to easily verify performance will
lower contributions to what is appropriate for an under-performing committee (but usually
inadequate for control).
• Equity theory: farmers with many cattle benefit much more than those with few, and have
incentives to reduce their contributions, farmers with few cattle respond by opting out of
control.70
• Willingness to pay for control declines with success of control: as disease levels fall, concern
over disease falls and farmers lose interest in control.
• Risk and uncertainty: control depends on others joining in and adequately performing
activities, and individuals must factor in the risk that others may not be able or willing to make
these contributions.
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The equity theory model consists of two internal
evaluations: 1) beliefs about what is a fair return (output)
for the effort (input), and 2) a comparison with the inputs
and outputs of others so that an evaluative judgment of
fairness can be made. An evaluation of “unfair” leads to
dissonance that creates an internal psychological conflict
and motivates the individual to resolve the inequity. This
drive to restore equity may take many forms—some may
increase their inputs, reduce their expected output,
change the comparison, withdraw, and so forth.
• Perverse incentives: potentially important actors have major financial interests in the continued
presence of tsetse (for example, trypanocides make up a substantial proportion of income of
private veterinarians)71.
• Externalities: all the benefits of control are not captured by the sedentary farmers who are
usually responsible for providing it (e.g. benefits to transhumants and to human health), which
implies that vector control will be underprovided.
• Inability to pay: trypanosomosis is a problem afflicting poor farmers in developing countries.
These have little money, many demands for cash, and liquidity and cash-flow problems. In
some cases (e.g. pastoralists), the local economy may be only partially monetised.
For many of these factors, counterarguments or compensations exist a, but taken together (the sum
being perhaps greater than the parts) they do offer some explanation as to why Community
Trypanosomosis Control seems to be less sustainable than the comparable institution of
Community Animal Health: sustainability is very rare for the former but not uncommon for the
latter72.
It is also argued that because of high transaction costs and perverse incentives, unsupported
communities are inherently unsuited for any activity that requires mobilising regular resources,
purchasing materials, providing regular services and receiving payments73. The generally poor
performance of community-managed dips, drug shops, funds and ranches in contrast to the
relatively better performance of privately-managed dips, drug-selling businesses, financial services
and farms, supports this argument74. The most successful community based systems are often those
where business activities are delegated to the private sector, or which are run on strictly business
principles. Systems managed effectively by communities such as maintenance of infrastructure,
management of common property, defence and security, are often non-monetized, public
institutions where the costs of verifying contributions and defalcations are low, the incentives for
management high and opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour few. In addition these systems
have developed with time and evolved complex rules that reward compliance and sanction
non-compliance 75. None of these good management factors are substantially present in the current
models of community animal health provision systems, and in addition the provision of windfall
(free) resources from external agencies provides a strong incentive for guilt-free financial
mismanagement: everyone’s business is nobody’s business.
This narrative has considerable verisimilitude and explanatory power and is partially supported by
this review. It is helpful insofar as it directs attention towards other service providers (e.g. the
private sector; small, self-selected interest groups; local development agencies such as churches)
who have much better records of sustainability than ‘the community sensu latu or conventional,
externally-initiated village groups. However, this narrative ignores the fact that it is very unusual
for communities to control and manage the trypanosomosis control process: if a system has not
been tried, it is perhaps unfair to say it doesn’t work.
Communities’ explanatory narratives
The communities’ explanations for failure were more situation-specific (and honest?) than
narratives constructed by outsiders (unsurprisingly as they have no access to information on the
sustainability in other sites). Although communities also blamed outsiders and the absent, they
focussed more on practical problems, as is shown in Table 8.1.
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a For example collective goods can be provided by small groups provided the benefits to that group out-weigh the costs, information
provision can counter decline in interest, high social capital can decrease the risk of others not contributing, poor farmers do pay
substantial amounts for animal health ….
Table 8.1. Communities’ explanations for the failure of vector control to continue in 8 communities
Strategy Reason Average Rank
Pour-ons are not
used because:
It was prohibitively expensive 1
We did not know how to use it 2
Screens are not
used because:
They were prohibitively expensive 1
We didn’t know how to make screens or treat them with insecticide 2
We couldn’t organise it 3
Sprays are not
used because:
Not enough animals are being sprayed to provide control because:
Not everyone uses sprays, some are too poor
Sprays are only used on valuable animals & those with ticks
Sprays are only used in the rainy season
1
Animals are not being sprayed at the same time because
We have cash flow problems, not everyone has money at the same time
We can’t organise it
We don’t know what is needed to control tsetse with animal baits
2
These explanations are useful; they have high verisimilitude and explanatory power. The
communities’ perceptions led to the identification of the three critical fail-points of control.
Control fails if:
1.  Communities can’t do control
2.  Communities can’t manage control
3.  Communities can’t afford control
Communities also drew attention to the important fact that village organisations can’t organise the
village. All villages had farmer organisations formed on the standard model; none of the village
organisations proved capable of managing tsetse control once the project left. This is not unusual;
although few studies exist on the long-term performance of community livestock groups, the
available evidence and experience suggests that many village organisations in the absence of
quality external support or integration into the political process have little sustainability or
efficacy.76
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9. Applying lessons learned
One of the objectives of this review was to learn lessons in order to inform a planned community-
based trypanosomosis project in Kenedougou, Burkina Faso. This section describes key lessons for
future control to emerge from the review.
Assessing the severity and risk of trypanosomosis and drug resistance
A key element in the successful control of trypanosomosis by projects in Burkina was the
development of entomological and epidemiological survey techniques, allowing trypanosomosis
to be assessed and monitored. The Production Opportunity Set template, incorporating prevalence
and red blood cell count is an example of a useful tool for monitoring77. Unfortunately,
entomological and epidemiological surveys have high cost and high requirements for trained
personnel and equipment that are not routinely met in sub-Saharan Africa. An objective of the
current project is the development, testing and communication of more rapid and appropriate
methods of assessing trypanocide resistance.
Assessing farmer perception of severity and risk of trypanosomosis and drug
resistance
Epidemiological data do not always correspond with farmer perception. Trypanosomosis control
may be a real or not-real need from the epidemiological perspective and a felt or unfelt need
(which is articulated or not-articulated) from the sociological perspective. If farmers do not
consider trypanosomosis to be a priority, then community based control is unlikely to be
successful. Many methodologies are available for assessing socio-cultural factors and perceptions:
Knowledge, Attitude and Practice surveys78 are widely used in human health assessments, and PRA
is a lead method in rural development. These potentially useful methods have yet to be generally
applied to participatory trypanosomosis control, and the project will investigate their application.
Findings will be compared with household surveys and epidemiological/entomological data. Some
PRA techniques have already been used in trypanosomosis control79,80 and the project will examine
the usefulness of other tools (e.g. ranking, problem diagnosis, progeny histories and
ethno-veterinary assessment) in trypanosomosis assessment and control.81
Investigating wealth, cattle ownership, ethno-linguistic diversity and capacity for
communal action
A finding from the projects in Burkina Faso reviewed here was that high social capital,
homogenous groups, and high cattle ownership were relevant to successful implementation of
control, although none of these factors influenced long-term viability. Other studies have also
emphasised this82. The Kenedougou project will evaluate cattle ownership, group size and capacity
for communal action as predictors for successful and sustainable control.
A holistic approach to other disease problems
The review showed that trypanosomosis should be placed in the context of other animal health
needs and animal health-seeking behaviour. Other projects have also found that trypanosomosis
can be controlled without having substantial benefits for animal health, if other diseases are not
also addressed.
Promoting Rational Drug Use
Some projects in Burkina Faso found that trypanocide use actually increased after successful
vector control, and other studies have found paradoxically high levels of drug use where
prevalence is low. Animal health-giving behaviour can be resistant to change, and habits of giving
treatments can continue even when no longer appropriate. Incorporating training and information
on the rational use of trypanocides may prevent this, and will be investigated further by the
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project.  Trypanocide use is the control strategy most used by farmers and is likely to continue to
be used in integrated control. The irrational use of drugs by farmers undermines the sustainability
of this lead strategy through fostering the development of drug resistance. The Kenedougou project
will investigate why farmers use drugs irrationally and how they can be influenced to use drugs
more rationally. Potentially significant factors are information asymmetries, agent-principal
problems, perverse incentives (drug-pushing by private sector), attitudes towards risk, bounded
rationality and externalities (drug resistance). Investigations of drug use will generate messages for
decision makers in national and international fora. One of the strategies offered to farmers will be
training, with a major focus on the better use of available animal health products. Two levels of
training will be available: detailed training for regular product users (vaccinators, herders and local
experts) and general training for farmers and occasional users.
Investigating farmer willingness and ability to contribute
Inability or unwillingness to pay for control was probably the single most important reason for
non-sustainability. The project will investigate how farmers make judgements and estimate
benefits and costs in order to decide whether, and how much, to invest in vector control. It will
compare farmer judgements with conventional analyses and contingent valuation methods. The
project will develop and refine participatory budgeting techniques that enable communities to
carry out financial planning.
Technical best bet
Technical best-bet solutions will be documented and offered to communities. Communities will
decide which are appropriate in light of their needs and abilities. Communities will be advised on
the technical efficacy of their chosen strategies, helped to evaluate the strategies with participatory
monitoring and evaluation and given the opportunity to re-visit strategies and change their minds.
Institutional best bet
Community management has been a fail-point in all projects. The Kenedougou project will try and
avoid this by devolving decision-making control to the farmers from the start, by seeking to avoid
systems with perverse incentives, and by using unconventional and appropriate community
organisations.
Addressing sustainability fail-points
All the skills needed for carrying out control of trypanosomosis will be located in communities.
Technical information will be deposited in easy-to-understand format. Communities will be
responsible for managing the process of control; this may be an interventionist or laissez faire
approach, depending on the needs, capacities and wishes of each community. Communities will
have to meet all recurrent costs of control (the project may meet start-up costs). The project will
have a primary objective of sustainable community-based trypanosomosis control, and a
secondary objective of sustainable trypanosomosis response capacity. The project will seek to
de-couple control systems so the failure of one strategy to be sustainable will not jeopardise the
other strategies.
Looking outside the project boundary
The Kenedougou project will facilitate trypanosomosis control in four villages, a vanishingly small
contribution to control of trypanosomosis in the cotton zone of West Africa. Such a mini-project
can best contribute to the overall project aims (and justify its relatively high costs) if its objective is
not only to facilitate trypanosomosis control in the villages concerned, but also to provide an
opportunity for ground-truthing, lesson learning and developing methods of wider applicability.
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10. Sustainability - and when it doesn’t matter
An important (but not unanticipated) finding of this review was that, though the participative
(low-level) projects had 100% efficacy, they had 0% sustainability. However this apparent failure
should be considered in the context of the equally poor sustainability of trypanosomosis control by
governments, projects and research institutions83. In fact, only three approaches to tsetse control
appear to have high sustainability, and these are of little development relevance.
• Eradication of isolated populations of flies, in sites where re-invasion is not possible because
infested areas are surrounded by water or large extents of land unsuitable to tsetse is usually
successful. 84 However, only a small minority of infested areas meet these criteria.
• Unplanned control through changes in land use has been the single most successful way of
reducing tsetse85. By definition this cannot be used as a deliberate strategy or a pro-active
development activity, as other factors overwhelmingly drive the change in land-use. Moreover,
extrapolations indicate that tsetse will remain a significant problem over much of its current
area well into the 21st century86.
• Privately-owned large ranches are reported to have reasonable success at vector control.12
There are several factors for this, such as centralised control, cash availability, high level of
management skills, and existing infrastructure. Private estates also effectively and sustainably
manage cattle dips, which communities or governments very rarely do. However only small
and decreasing amounts of land are managed as estates and these are by and large peripheral
to development.
On-going vector control with external support
As all methods of development-relevant vector control require external support, the crux is not
whether community-based control is sustainable but whether a) there is need for externally
supported vector control and b) if there is a need, which actors are best able to provide it.
Many, if not most, development interventions
require continued external support and cannot be
entirely financed by the immediate beneficiaries (for
example education, health and much infrastructure).
External support is justified by equity considerations
(beneficiaries are disadvantaged, underprivileged and entitled to assistance), efficiency
considerations (existence of market failure for service delivery) and enlightened self-interest
considerations (failure to redress poverty destabilises the inter-linked global system). Among
competing demands for scarce development money, trypanosomosis has been reasonably effective
in making a case for continued supporta.
Assuming that the invisible hand of the development market place will continue to allocate funds
to trypanosomosis control, the question can be reformulated as “who is the provider of choice?” In
terms of widely applicable control, there are four significant providers – governments, projects,
research institutions (RI), and communities. Relative to other actors, communities have several
advantages. Because the problem is located in the community, the community has a strong
mandate for control and high incentives to carry out control. Costs of control are low and
effectiveness usually good. In addition control by communities can generate other benefits
(empowerment, capacity building) which are less likely when other actors are responsible for
control. It is now generally accepted that communities have a high entitlement to be given
responsibility for their development.
29
A recent review of community-based human
health programs showed that external
contributions varied from 49 to 94% of
recurrent costs. (Bennett et al. 1998)
a Current or recent donor funded programs/institutes with a veterinary focus on trypanosomosis include the Regional Tsetse and
Trypanosomiasis Control Programme (RTTCP) in Southern Africa, the Programme Against African Trypanosomiasis (PAAT), the
International Trypanotolerance Centre (ITC), CIRDES, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), the International Livestock
Research Institute (ILRI) and the International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE).
Table 10.1. Who is best at doing what
Projects RI Government Community
Costs of control High High Moderate Low
Effectiveness of control High High Moderate Moderate
Mandate for long-term control Low Low Moderate (declining) High
Additional benefits Moderate Low Low High
(It should not need saying that community-based control is not about having communities do
everything, rather it is about communities doing the things that only communities can do and the
things that communities do best. In community tsetse control, for example, the community may be
responsible for ensuring farmers spray their animals at the same time, for placing social sanctions
and rewards, and perhaps even for the ad hoc pooling of resources between sub-groups with high
social capital to achieve savings by bulk purchases. But delivering products would almost certainly
be done by the private sector which does business best, and the government services would have
the overall mandate of regulation, the prerogative of the state.)
Limited-duration vector control
It is not always essential that trypanosomosis control should be sustainable. In many of the
projects in Burkina Faso, trypanosomosis was out of control as result of temporary biocenoses (that
is, one-off events where susceptible animals are exposed for the first time to high risk). The recent
settlements of pastoralists in Samorogouan, Yale, Sideradougou and Satiri are examples of this; the
stopping of long-standing vector control campaigns for river-blindness had the same effect in other
villages. These sudden shifts of the host-pathogen-vector-management interface lead to very high
levels of disease, but only for limited
periods. With time, new ecological
balances and coping strategies evolve and
the problem declines to a more
manageable level.  In these cases, control
can be seen as a bridging operation.
Other situations where limited-duration
vector control is indicated and has been
successful include: refugee camps; where
cattle keeping is a cultural innovation;
where pastoralists are forced to move into
high-risk areas because of drought.
In other cases, changes in land use or water use patterns are underway which will predictably
reduce the risk of trypanosomosis. Where previously infested tsetse areas have remained free, as it
has for example in one project area, there was a tendency for natural water sources to be used less
and pumps or wells to be used more. In other areas, forest galleries have almost completely
disappeared as the result of intensified land use. In these areas, trypanosomosis control can be
undertaken as a limited-duration operation.
Sustainable – but not yet?
The looming crisis of Total Drug Resistance (TDR) differs from the situations of the past in several
ways. Unlike temporary biocenoses which are self-limiting, TDR is self-perpetuating. The more
resistance there is, the more farmers use drugs, the more resistance accelerates. Even if drugs are
stopped, resistance may not disappear with time87. In the crises of the past, people had more
choices; for example, many were recent immigrants who could (and did) leave at little cost, unlike
the settled agro-pastoralists of the cotton zone. In the past, the individual strategy of drugs was
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In Dafinso the health services stopped routinely treating
water courses with insecticides. These treatments had kept
tsetse at very low levels, so disease was rare and cattle
were susceptible. When this was stopped there was an
upsurge in flies and very high levels of mortality. The
project successfully controlled trypanosomosis for two
years. Control broke down immediately the project left,
but by this time the farmers and the animals had adapted
to the situation and though trypanosomosis remains a
problem, it is no longer a crisis.
available; TDR renders this inutile. Previous crises were epidemic in nature with dramatic losses,
and this very visible crisis made it easier for villagers to claim entitlement to external support.
Conversely TDR is a creeping problem that generates less entitlement. The combination of these
factors could lead to a self-perpetuating crisis, with little external support and no alternative to
vector control and this may provide considerably more incentives for communal action.
Communities have always collapsed or organised in the presence of crises, and it may be that
once TDR has entered the consciousness of farmers, vector control methods will develop.
Unfortunately this will probably be too late for many of the most poor and most vulnerable
farmers.
Changing the goal posts: Sustainable response capacity
Vector control is a victim of its own success. Successfully controlling tsetse removes the major
incentive for control, that is, the presence of tsetse and disease. Rather than trying to
institutionalise control, it might be preferable to shift the objective from sustainable control to
sustainable response capacity. Under this scenario, communities would control tsetse when the
problem was severe, stop controlling when the problem declined, and start controlling again when
the problem (inevitably) re-emerged. This would involve locating two new skills within
communities: the ability to detect epidemics and the ability to respond to them. The present
review found that where communities had little involvement in the process of control they lacked
confidence in their ability to carry it out, but if involved they had confidence in their ability to
carry out activities unsupported.
Although sustainability may not always be necessary or possible, agreement on sustainability
objectives is essential. A common understanding should be reached between all stakeholders as to
the objective, and this must be re-visited throughout the project in light of changing external
circumstances.
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11. Better bet solutions?
This review finds that the impact of participative projects was minor and short-term (benefiting
around 60 villages and two pastoral zones for three to five years). Current approaches to
participative control do not seem likely to benefit significant numbers of people, and this section
suggests strategies with potential for mass impact.
Minimalist vector control, producta development and social marketing
Much work has been done on technical aspects of vector control but little on market
characteristics or adapting products to potential customers88, with the result that almost nothing is
known about the types of vector control people want and are willing to pay for, or how demand
for vector control can be created (social marketing). It is possible that by improving ease-of-use
(e.g. better administration, packaging and delivery systems) and reducing costs (by using
minimalist control solutions), vector control packages could be developed that would sell
themselves, that is, farmers would continue to use them and spontaneously adopt them, as has
been the case for antibiotics and trypanocides. These are almost universally used because they
often work, are widely available, are convenient to use and cheap to buy.
Promoting community trypanosomosis control among development actors
Development will continue to play a large role in sub-Saharan Africa for the immediate future, and
it is likely that there will be increasing diversity of stakeholders involved, with national and local
organisations becoming more important. If Community Vector Control were taken up as a lead
strategy by more development actors, it would have much more impact. A subjective impression is
that there is much scope for increasing the number of development actors involved in Community
Vector Control which seems, for example, to be less popular and less well executed than the
comparable institution of Community Animal Health. There seems to be two main uptake barriers:
• The high cost and skill requirements for epidemiological/entomological surveys are prohibitive
for many development actors. (For example, the cost of surveys in the Kenedougou project
(four villages) is around $US 10,000 per year, in contrast Community Animal Health Workers
can be trained and equipped for as little as US$ 10 each)
• There is a lack of promotional and instructional material on Community Trypanosomosis
Control. (In contrast, there are dozens of do-it-yourself guides, curricula, videos, booklets and
manuals on CAH).
A possible strategy is to investigate the barriers to uptake of Community Trypanosomosis Control
by development actors and to develop ways of overcoming these. There is considerable potential
to reduce the costs and complexities of assessing trypanosomosis and tsetse risk by refining current
evaluation protocols and using participatory epidemiological tools, and to produce more
information targeted at a non-specialist audience.
Involving the animal-health-product sector
Trypanosomosis and tsetse control effectively rests on the use of drugs and insecticides. Improving
control predicates changing the purchasing habits of farmers. The animal health sector has strong
incentives and high skills in providing products that farmers want to use and pay for. Research
institutions have much weaker incentives, skills and experience in this. For substantial, sustainable
change in control practice, it is indispensable to involve the private sector (while avoiding capture
and recognising that more rational use of drugs is not in the short-term interests of the private
sector).
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a Product encompassing material, packaging and method of use.
Changing and innovating institutions and policies
This review and on-going work in Burkina Faso showed how the use of animal health services is
conditioned by a range of legal and extra-legal rules and norms. At national level the strategies
currently used by farmers can be enhanced by improving the policies, rules and regulations (legal
and extra-legal) that govern animal health provision and consumption. This is particularly relevant
to the use of trypanocides, currently the most important strategy for control. Changing policies on
drug use could be a low-cost and far-reaching strategy for improving the utilisation of drugs and
safeguarding trypanocides for the future.
Although resistance to trypanocides is an externality of private consumption, the management of
resistance is a global public good that will be underprovided by the market, and requires action at
a supra-national level as well as national and local level. If the adverse impacts of resistance
warrant action, there may be need to develop regional and global institutions for this.
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12. Conclusions and quo vadis?
This review looked at eight trypanosomosis control projects in Burkina Faso, six of which had a
participatory component. These projects provided a rich insight into the process of trypanosomosis
control and many important lessons and valuable insights. In general the projects were very
effective at control and demonstrated high levels of technical innovation and quality. Institutional
and sociological aspects were less strong; participation was at lower levels and none of the
projects proved to be sustainable.
While community-based trypanosomosis control was not used in Burkina Faso, its consistently
poor sustainability elsewhere makes it difficult to be convincingly optimistic about prospects for
widespread adoption or major impact on the control of trypanosomosis and management of
resistance. History is not destiny, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that while sustainability
is possible, it is not probable. This review argues that some of the concern over sustainability is
misplaced. There are many situations where limited-duration trypanosomosis control is
appropriate, or where continued external support is available and justifiable. Where the objective
is community auto-financing, prospects for success can be significantly increased by good
program design, a high-level participatory approach and by institutionalising response capacity as
well as (or instead of) continuous control. Minimalist, low-cost versions of vector control may be
possible that will significantly lower the barriers to adoption. Furthermore, the situation in the west
African cotton zone is dynamic and likely to change for the worse. If Multiple Drug Resistance
becomes widespread, communities will have a powerful new incentive for communal vector
control.
But while acknowledging these important actual and potential roles for community-based vector
control, it seems at best unlikely that communities will spontaneously organise to sustainably
provide vector control, or external actors will support open-ended control, on a scale that makes
an appreciable difference to farmers in the cotton zone.
In the light of this, and of the low cover and high cost of externally supported trypanosomosis
control, (both community-based and conventional), the option of looking at control in
communities rather than by communities may be a better bet. Communities have a rich repertoire
of endogenous control strategies. Enabling these to work better by stroke-of-the-pen reforms has
potential to benefit large numbers at low cost, but will require policy and institutional change and
the involvement of the private sector. The understanding gained from, and the ground-truthing
opportunities offered by, micro-level projects such as those carried out over 25 years in Burkina
Faso and the project planned for Kenedougou can offer a valuable contribution to understanding
the needs for macro-level institutional formation and transformation.
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Picture 5: Tsetse no more — the future for riverine galleries in the cotton zone?
ANNEX 1: SUMMARIES OF PROJECTS IN BURKINA FASO
These summaries are taken from four main sources: firstly, CIRDES annual reports (these were
particularly useful as they gave a contemporary account which often differed interestingly from
subsequent accounts); secondly published papers and working documents; thirdly discussions with
CIRDES staff who were involved in the projects; and lastly Focus Group Discussions with farmers.
CIRDES-supported control has been carried out in over 80 villages in Burkina Faso covering more
than half a million hectares.
Samorogouan- Kenedougou
Scale :Samorogouan Ranch
Province: Kenedougou
Partner: CEZIET – Centre d’Encadrement des Zones
d’Intensification de l’Élevage Traditionnel
Years: 1989-95
System: Pastoral, settled on ranches
Chronology
Technical strategies:
Deltamethrin 1% pour-on
Screens
Social strategies:
?
1978-84 Following the droughts of the 70s and 80s, pastoralists from the north start moving southward into
Kenedougou. A World Bank project designates Samorogouan a Pastoral zone. Four Ranches were
set up with the objective to intensify cattle production and infrastructure – roads, wells, schools etc
provided.
1982 on Frequent disease episodes in cattle maintained under isometamidium prophylaxis (mainly
Trypanosoma congolense) suggests that drug resistance may be emerging. Tests in mice show that
T. congolense stocks isolated in 1982-83 are 4 to 8 times less sensitive to isometamidium that
those isolated in 1979-80.
1989 Serious losses encountered from trypanosomosis and the Director of the project requests help from
CIRDES.
1990 An entomological and epidemiological survey is carried out revealing high prevalence of
trypanosomosis. (On Ranches 1, 3 and 4, prevalence is 5-20%, and on Ranch 2, Prevalence is up
to 80%). Animals are treated with Berenil® at 1½ and then twice the normal dose, but without
effect. Drug resistance is suspected and animal tests reveal that T. congolense is resistant to
isometamidium chloride, diminazene aceturate and quinpyramine sulphate.
In December a pour-on campaign is started.  Cattle (1 500-2 000) are given monthly treatments.
1991 The pour-on treatments are reduced to every second month.
1992 On Ranch 1, 2000-3000 cattle continue to be treated with deltamethrin every 2 months and on
Ranch 2, 1200-1700 bovines.
An entomological/epidemiological monitoring is carried out every 2 months, but shows no
improvement in prevalence or PCV. In the annual CIRDES report, it is concluded that the large
plain of Souri cannot be effectively protected by treating 5 000 animals.  For this, it would be
necessary to treat all the animals that graze the plain (Ranch 3 and 4 – 7000 animals) and also use
screens in certain places. Control focuses on Ranch 2 which is the priority area.
1993 On Ranch 1, 451-1508 cattle are treated with Butox® spray, on average 893 per treatment.
Prevalence varies from 1.4% to 12.3%, and average PCV is 28.9. On Ranch 2, 1 656-2 044 cattle
are treated with spot-on, an average of 1744 per treatment. Prevalence varies from 5 to 18.4%,
average PCV is 27.6.
1994 On Ranch 1, an average of 667 cattle are treated with Butox® spray every 2 months. Prevalence
varies from 0-6.8%, and average PCV is 31.2%.On Ranch 2, 1 492 cattle are treated with Butox®
pour-on. Infection is  0-1.1%, and PCV 30.4.
Entomological surveys reveal very low levels of G palpalis persist.
1996 Two treatments are given in June & October (4344 animals from Ranch 1 and 2) as phase-out
treatments. It is planned to hand over operations to the community.
2003 This project was not visited during the review. However community-managed vector control is not
reported to be taking place.
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CIRDES reports PCV increases from a low of 22.7 to over 30.0
Prevalence decreases from more than 80% to less than 5 %
Tsetse decrease from more than 50 flies per trap per day to less than 2.
Dafinso
Scale: Dafinso village
Dept: Houet
Years: 1993–1995
Partners: Village Association, CPRA, CIRDES
System: Agro-pastoral
Technical strategies:
60 monoconical traps impregnated with cypermethrin and
replaced every 3 months.
Butox® (deltamethrin 5%) every month then Bayofly®
(cyfluthrine 1% pour-on)
Social strategies:
Village groups formed by the Ministry of Agriculture
Chronology
1990? Farmers recall that government campaigns to spray insecticide along the two rivers close to
Dafinso stops (onchocerciasis campaign); this leads to resurgence in tsetse numbers and later
trypanosomosis.
1992 Farmers recall that flies bite people even in the village; there is high mortality and morbidity in
cattle, as many as 10 deaths in one year. It becomes impossible to keep donkeys and all die.
Farmers do not know what is causing the deaths; they suspect witchcraft and some leave the
village.
The Village Association, organised by the state agriculture services, contacts the Regional
Agricultural Production Centre  (CPRA) which in turn contacts CIRDES.
1993 CIRDES reports that in February an entomological/epidemiological survey is carried out. This is
followed by a meeting with the villagers. It is agreed that screens and pour-ons will be used.
CIRDES will provide the traps and the villagers will contribute 100 000 FCFA during the course
of the year. CIRDES will provide pour-on treatments every month, and the villagers will
contribute 60 FCFA per animal treated. CIRDES provides the screens as a loan.
Villagers report that the initial treatments were free, and after that they paid 45 FCFA.
1994 Farmers report that there is rapid resolution of trypanosomosis and reduction in tsetse; the
benefits are visible within months.
The Village Association is unable to repay the 100 000 FCFA, because there is no money in the
treasury.
Villagers are unwilling to pay for the pour-ons; they find these too expensive.
CIRDES withdraws following a breakdown in relationships because the loan has not been
repaid.
1995-2003 Farmers report that individual vector control and treatment of animals continues but no
concerted action.
Trypanosomosis returns but is not so serious as before, perhaps because the riverine galleries
have greatly decreased, or host vector balance is re-established.
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Impact
CIRDES reports After 3 months G. tachinoides was reduced by 99.8% and G. palpalis reduced by 67.1%. After
8 months, both were almost zero.
Prevalence was initially 30% in cattle , but after a few months there was much less disease.
Farmer reports Within a few months they noticed a considerable decrease in the numbers of tsetse.
People who cultivate small plots beside the river could sleep at ease after the campaign;
there were no flies to bite them.
This was followed by a decrease in animal disease and abortions.
They were able to use fewer medicines; they reduced ISMM treatment to once at the start
of the rains.
The animals were in visibly better condition.
They were able to keep donkeys and the numbers of animals increased.
One Peul, who had lost all his animals, has now 300 cattle and has bought 2 motorised
bicycles.
The main difficulty was the high cost.
There was also a problem with the village organisation; this was established by the
Department of Agriculture.
All the farmers are members, they all pay a membership fee, and work on a communal
field and the profits of this go to the group.
However there is no money left and people are not interested to work on the common
field or to pay membership fees.
Padema and Solenzo
Scale: 9 villages in Padema, 6 in Solenzo
14 hamlets in Padema
Departments: Padema and Solenzo
Years: 1993-1998
Partners; PDRI, SPRA, private veterinarians, CIRDES
System: Mixed cotton-cereal-livestock
Technical strategies:
Sprays: deltamethrin 1%
Screens
Social strategies:
Village groups formed by the PDRI, with and apex
departmental management committee
Timeline
1973, 84 Large influx of pastoralists as a result of droughts in the early seventies.
1991 The PDRI, an integrated rural development program, is established. Trypanosomosis control is
not originally planned but farmers in Padema and other villages report concern over high
mortality in donkeys. PDRI contacts government veterinary services who contact CIRDES.  The
PDRI decides to start participative trypanosomosis control.
1993 A trypanosome control unit starts (PLTAA) with support from CIRDES. Six months are spent in
meetings with the different actors to establish roles. CIRDES entomological and epidemiological
survey shows high levels of tsetse and trypanosomosis infection in Padema (ADP 6, infection
28%) and Solenzo (ADP 7, infection 15%).
1994 Farmers have only contributed 50% (1 million FCFA) of the costs instead of the 70% agreed.
However the activities go ahead. Under co-ordination of PDRI/HKM, a program of control is
developed by CIRDES with involvement of SPRA, medical services and private vets. This includes
a study trip to Satiri for farmer-to-farmer extension, training of farmers and training of local tailors
to make screens. Farmers also get training in treating screens with insecticide.
In May, 1500 screens are deployed (more than 3 months behind schedule), by farmers under
supervision of CIRDES. Screens are removed too late and with little co-ordination; only 1 000 are
retrieved. Spraying starts by the private vet in July, August and November (different dates are
given for this). Out of 8 000 to 10 000 cattle, 5 020 were presented, then 3 320, 3 370 and
finally 3 570. Farmers report there were originally two private vets, and later 4. All were based in
Bobo Dioulassou.
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1995 In January, only 600 screens are put in place (behind schedule). Collectively-managed funds are
not working, there are suspicions of misappropriation. Screens have not been placed and
treatment sessions have low participation by farmers.  Private vets have charged “extortionately”
for treatments. In May, the program is temporarily suspended. A meeting is planned for
December to re-launch at Padema and extend to 6 new villages in Solenzo. From November
1995 to April 1996 extension is held in the villages to relaunch the scheme, new village
management committees are formed and attempts are made to involve the pastoralists and other
groups left out of the first phase.
1996 In March, activities restart. There is a delay in obtaining special cloth from Côte d’Ivoire to make
the screens. It is agreed that 2000 screens will be placed in Padema and 1800 in Solenzo. There
is a 3-month delay in starting spraying, eventually, treatments with deltamethrin 5% are given in
August and November in Padema (4000 animals) and September and December in Solenzo
(6000 animals). It emerges that there are internal dissensions in villages and some farmers are
refusing to present animals. Three entomological/epidemiological surveys are carried out, but a
reduction in disease is not perceptible due to non placement of screens and carrying out
epicutaneous treatment of cattle at a time of dispersion of vectors. Farmers report that the number
of private vets increases from 2 to 4; 3 are based in Bobo and one in Kouka.
1997 CIRDES report that activities suspended in 1996 restarted with better extension of livestock
keepers. PLTAA finds the same constraints despite the efforts to re-launch the programs.
1998 In March, 1500 screens are deployed in Padema and 1200 screens in Solenzo. Farmers report
that project activities finish, and they are told that a second phase will start in the near future.
Screens are left in the village, but are not placed and have become rotten.
1999 Farmers report that tsetse return, and high losses are again experienced.
2000 Farmers go to Bobo Dioulassou to see if they can get more help, but report that nothing concrete
is achieved.
2003 Farmers report that trypanosomosis is a serious problem. They are using trypanocides and the
drugs find they are usually effective. Most people spray their own animals in the rainy season, but
no concerted spraying is carried out.
Impact
Project
Reports
Prevalence decreases from 28 to 4%
Tsetse per trap per day reduces from 6-7 flies per day per trap to 2-4 flies per day
Farmer
reports
Control was very effective, the animals did not die and they grew fat.
There was milk in the households.
The cattle were able to do more work in the fields.
There were less flies bothering the people who work near the water.
Farmer
reports
A lot of effort is needed in placing screens, people lost interest in placing them and we had to
pay them to place the screens.
There were many problems with the different people involved.
We had to pay a lot of money for things we did not want.
The private vets charged high prices for things we could get more cheaply in the markets.
We had to pay officials to attend the meetings and that used a lot of money.
The village committees did not have control over their budget and they always overspent – it is
better to give them a fixed amount and they will not spend more.
Bondoukuy
Scale: Bondoukuy, Moulouna, Bolomakote, Bokuy, Kera
Koumana, Wakuy, Dampan villages
Dept: Bondukuy
Province: Mohoun
1995-1997
Partners :Parastatal Development Project (Projet Développement
Rurale Intégrée or PDRI), CIRDES.
System – Agro-pastoral
Technical strategies:
Screens
Deltametrin spray and pour-ons
Social strategies:
Village Associations
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Chronology
1967 Farmers recall the start of treatment of animals against trypanosomosis by the veterinary services
at Dedougou.
1969-70 Farmers recall start of extension to farmers for preventative treatments for trypanosomosis.
1974 Farmers recall start of using community members for animal health (vaccinators in rinderpest
campaign).
180-82 Farmers recall an outbreak of respiratory disease in cattle and disease with nervous signs.
1983 Farmers recall that many animals are dead of trypanosomosis.
1991 Farmers recall a Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic.
Community reports the PDRI starts work and they identify trypanosomosis as a problem.
1995 Community reports that CIRDES called a meeting with all the villages. The communities decided
which wanted to participate.
1996 CIRDES reports indicate a choice of 2 epicutaneous treatments is proposed to villagers, either
deltamethrin 5% at cost of 75 FCFA per animal or flumethrin 1% pour-on at a cost of 350 FCFA
per animal. Treatments are offered in January, March, June and September; 546-939 animals are
presented out of approximately 6000. 86% of the animals presented are treated with
deltamethrin.
During the year, four entomological/epidemiological surveys are carried out but there was
difficulty in following sentinel animals making it hard to evaluate impact.
1997 600 screens along Mohoun and tributaries. An attempt was made to reduce pour-ons to 12.5%
of the herd, treating six times in 21 months. This did not control tsetse, and it was proposed to
increase to 50% of the herd
1996 Sociologic study on impact of trypanosomosis control and ecologic study on impact of
pesticides.
1998 Trypanosomosis returns and farmers have to use much more Berenil® and Trypamidium®.
2003 Trypanosomosis continues to be a serious problem. Farmers treat with Berenil® and
Trypamidium®, which usually works although sometimes they have to use 3 or 4 treatments.
They no longer use pour-ons.
Impact
Project
Reports
Farmers
reports
When animals are sick there is no money to be made.
The campaign was really successful, and we could see improvements within a few months.
All the animals were fat and healthy.
During three years there were no deaths among the cattle.
With pour-on you don’t need to treat all the animals; if a cow rubs against a treated animal, it is
also protected.
Donkeys did not get sick and die.
We spent less money on treating sick animals.
Farmers
reports
A lot of effort is needed in placing screens; if you just tell someone to do it they are unwilling,
they lose their time for the day and you end up having to pay them to do the work.
There are no pharmacies nearby, so getting entrants is a problem.
Associations are not very effective – they can’t manage the process.
The project only showed us part of the skills needed for control.
There was a lack of confidence between the producers.
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Satiri & Bekuy89
Scale – 24 villages
Dept: Satiri and Bekuy
Province: Houet
Years: Satiri 1987 - 95
Partners: CIRDES, PNGT, DPRA
System: Agropastoral
Technical strategies:
Bayticol® (Flumethrin pour-on 1%)
Deltamethrin spray
Monoconical traps impregnated cyfluthrine
Screens
Social strategies:
Village Groups
Chronology
1975 Onchocerciasis campaign starts, with regular spraying of insecticides along the watercourse in
populated areas.
1970/80 Fulani pastoralists (Peul) settle in Satiri, Mossi in Bequy.
1970’s Promotion of cotton and draft technology by government extension services.
1980 Trypanosomosis starts to be a problem about 4-5 years after settlement of Fulani.
1985 High losses are encountered from trypanosomosis; farmers report 50-70% of cattle die.
1986 Farmers report problems to Prefect; he goes to the government veterinary service, which in turn
contacts CIRDES.
An epidemiological survey is carried out at the end of the year showing a prevalence of >40%.
1987 Farmers report the campaign starts in four villages, flumethrin pour-on is given and DIM
treatment provided, both free of charge. CIRDES reports around 2 000 animals treated per
month out of a population of 10 000.
1988 Farmers report that the project establishes groups to manage for each village; these consist of a
management committee and all the village are members (no membership charge). The main
function of the group is to pass on information.
1989 In addition 130 monoconical traps and screens constituting four barriers to prevent re-invasion
are established and treated with cyfluthrin 0.3% every 2-3 months. CIRDES reports that
financial contribution of 220 000 FCFA is given by the villagers to maintain the barriers.
1990 CIRDES reports that 150 000 FCFA is contributed for screens.
1992 Cattle are treated with deltamethrin or flumethrin and screens placed in inaccessible areas.
Epidemiologic and entomologic studies are carried out.
1993 Six treatments with deltamethrin (sprays) are carried out, with on average 1424 cattle per
treatment. Prevalence varies from 0 to 21%.
1994 The transfer of operations to farmers is the subject of numerous meetings with PDRI/HKI, SPRA,
DPS, farmers, with supervision given to PNGT. As transition, one final treatment is given in the
two zones, comprising flumethrin (1901 animals) and deltamethrin (1323 animals).
Video cassette made.
1995 From January to October, 10 509 cattle are treated in Satiri and 1742 in Bekuy to act as
transition.
1996 Delay in program due to finalisation of financing and allocating responsibilities between the
PNGT, SPRA, PDRI, DPS, farmers and CIRDES.
1996/7 Sociologic studies on impact of trypanosomosis control and an ecologic study on control
carried out.
1998 Tsetse return and with them, trypanosomosis.
2003 Farmers are experiencing high losses from trypanosomosis. They treat with trypanocides and
spray as individuals.
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Impacts
CIRDES reports
benefits
PCV increase from 26 to 31 after two treatments.
Prevalence drops from 40% to less than 5% after two pour-on treatments.
Tsetse decrease from nearly 50 flies caught per trap per day to less than 5.
Farmer-reported
benefits
The animals had a healthy appearance, they ate well and gained weight
There were fewer abortions and less trypanosomosis
The traction animals were able to do more work
There were more normal births, more milk, and increasing numbers of cattle.
Expenditure on trypanocides decreased – where before we gave 3 treatments, after
we gave one.
There was more money – people bought roofs, engines, and some were able to visit
Mecca.
Farmer reported
problems
The main problem is the high cost.
Difficulties between the farmers make working together impossible.
The work involved is not easy – carrying traps, and clearing the bush around them.
Yale, Sissili90
Scale : Pastoral Development Zone (Zone d’Aménagement
Pastorale de Yale ZAP)
259 households
Province: Sissili
Years: 1994-1997
Partners:  PDR-Sissili then PSAE 7 FED
Involved: SPRA, Private vet, National Veterinary Laboratory
System: Pastoral
Chronogram
Technical strategies:
Blue screens with 0.1% deltamethrin or
cypermethrin
Pour-on deltamethrin 1% every 2 months, then
3 months
Social strategies:
Livestock keepers groups formed by the SPRA
1983 Settlement established with infrastructure (wells, roads, cattle-holding grounds) provided by a
Dutch project.
1989 Officially declared a pastoral zone.
1989-90. Outbreak of trypanosomosis. Farmers report that total cattle decrease from 7500 in 1989 to 1500
in 1992, this is confirmed by veterinary services. Farmers report losses from 75% to 85% of the
herd.
1990: Survey by National Veterinary Laboratory shows 27.5% of cattle have trypanosomosis and  5%
have brucellosis.
1991 Livestock services report 7,707 treatments with ISMM and 5,596 with DIM.
1993 In January, CIRDES carries out an entomological/epidemiological survey at the request of the
SPRA. Discussions with the livestock keepers in the ZAP and vet staff reveal a high mortality. Six
surveys are carried out over the year. It is planned to start a campaign in 1994 with 2000 screens
and epicutaneous treatment. CIRDES starts an eight month project for control of tsetse with
French development funding.
1994 From March to April, 1457 screens are placed (treated with 0.1% alpha-cypermethrin) along river
galleries. Screens are re-treated every three months, withdrawn in June and replaced in
November. TWO monthly treatments with 1% deltamethrin pour-on are carried out, (1500 cattle
attending initially increasing to 3000 for the last treatment of 1994). The initial treatments are
free. Socio-economic study is carried out.
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1995 From December 95 to November 96, entomological studies show marked improvements in all
parameters.
From December 95 to November 96, 7000 animals are given pour-on treatments every 3 months
(9457 attending the last treatment) and 1127 screens are placed. This results in a rapid and large
decrease in tsetse and prevalence. Meetings are held to insure sustainability, and it is planned to
decrease treatments to 2 per year. Screens are handed over to community management, and a
pilot project to control tsetse is planned for the game ranch of Nazinga (the principal site of
re-invasion). At this time 81 herdsmen were involved for 3 days each between March 94 and
December 95 in deployment and collection of screens
1996 Epidemiological studies show 10% disease prevalence. A socio-economic study is initiated.
Screens are replaced and 12.5% were missing (due to floods, thefts, and elephant damage).
Discussions were held to extend to Nahouri and Ziro and on how to ensure sustainability. It is
agreed to reduce to 2 pour-on treatments (one in May/ June for G. tachinoiders and one in
Sept/Oct for G morsitans submorsitans). Producers will start to pay 600 FCFA per animal and
treatments will be given by the agents of Project ZAP and SPRA of Sissili. The screens will be
totally handed over to the community with technical advice from CIRDES. There will be a pilot
project to control tsetse in Nazinga game area
1997 The reduction in treatments to two and charging 600 FCFA resulted in a large drop in treatments
(1 888 and 4 070, out of 7 500 for the two treatments). This leads to an upsurge in tsetse.
Sociologic study on impact of tryps control continues. Farmer willingness to pay as evinced by
contingent evaluation is estimated at $0.9/animal/yr, which would not be enough to fund
continued control. Contingent evaluation overestimates actual contribution; for labour, actual
contributions are only 16% of that pledged.
1999 The stopping of control activities in 97 led to an increase in tsetse and tryps. A meeting is held at
which it is agreed :
• to use either pour-on at 600 FCFA or spray at 300 FCFA twice monthly – the start date will be
fixed by farmers – and the private vet will be responsible for giving treatments
• to place screens after Feb 2000 –farmers are responsible aided by CIRDES, LNE, SPRA
• to carry out epidemiological follow-up in 99 and 2000 (4 visits) –  CIRDES, LNE, SPRA
responsible
2003 This project was not visited during the review. However community managed vector control is
not currently taking place.
Impacts
CIRDES survey
reports
PCV increased from a low of 26.5 to a high of 36.3%.
Clinically suspect cases drop from a high of 30.4% to permanently below 5%>
Prevalence drops from a maximum of 35% to less than 5%.
Decrease in tsetse more than 90%.
CIRDES household
survey
Increase in herd size, cattle number.
Reduction in mortality, abortion, stillbirth.
Increase in normal births and milk.
CIRDES
focus group
Increase in drug expenditure despite decreasing disease.
Cattle damage crops causing some conflicts.
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Non participative trypanosomosis control projects in Burkina Faso
Scale: Sideradougou zone
Years: 1984-88
Partners: Government
System: Pastoral
Technical strategies:
Traps
Sterile Males and Barrier
Ground sprays
Social strategies:
?
Chronology
80’s The Zone of Sideradougou is allocated as an area for pastoralists in dry season. Studies
revealed high levels of trypanosomosis – accounting for 50% of the veterinary interventions.
1980 Building up of colonies of sterile males and preparation for the eradication campaign.
1983 Traps are used to reduce fly numbers before the release of sterile males.
1984 Flies are almost totally eradicated, but small numbers persist in densely wooded areas; these
are sprayed with insecticide.
1985 After three years of intensive efforts, an area of 3 500 km2 is completely cleared, barriers are
put in place, and the government takes over maintenance.
1986-87 An animal health survey is carried out by CIRDES. It shows that in the centre of the control
zone, there is no trypanosomosis, but there are high levels of tick-borne disease. In the
periphery tsetse have re-invaded and trypanosomosis is present. No difference in calf weight is
found between centre and periphery. It is suggested that trypanosomosis control has led to
reduced levels of Berenil® treatments and this has led to an increase in tick-borne disease,
negating the benefits of trypanosomosis control.
1986 The first tsetse re-invasions are detected. After the end of external funding, the system collapsed
in less than a year as barriers were not maintained. However G. morsitans submorsitans does
not return.
Scale : Water Pumping Station (Station de Pompage de Nasso)
Years: 1993
Partners: Government water authority
System: Government organisation
Technical strategies:
Traps
Social strategies:
None
Chronology
1993 In February the government water authority asks for help because of high numbers of tsetse
around the water pumping station causing nuisance to the workers. An entomological survey
showed ADP of 6 Glossina palpalis per day and 0.125 Glossina tachinoides per day.
100 monoconical traps impregnated with cypermethrin were placed around the station. In July
there was a 97% reduction in G. palpalis and 68% reduction in G. tachinoides. The traps were
re-impregnated in August and October.
Aerial spraying campaigns
Aerial spraying of non-residual insecticides has been used to control tsetse, especially in areas of
human sleeping sickness. Under West African conditions, helicopters were found to be more suitable
than narrow-winged aircraft. They have less landing requirements, they are more manoeuvrable
allowing cover of the narrow, winding riverine and the rotor downwash gives better penetration into
dense forest canopies. In the 1970’s, several campaigns were carried out in Burkina Faso91. Two
spray systems (low and high speed) were used to apply endosulfan and synthetic pyrethroid aerosols.
The highest mortality achieved was 91.3% for Glossina tachinoides, using endosulfan at 9.0 g per
hectare. Dieldrin was also used, but found to be ineffective61. Because of the high operating costs and
personnel and equipment requirements, aerial spraying is now rarely used and this approach has
little relevance in the current economic and institutional context of west Africa.
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